BUILDING SOUND HOMELAND SECURITY FOUNDATIONS: ENHANCING LOCAL POLICE-FIRE COOPERATION

An Executive Summit of Emergency Service Professionals

The Foundation for Emergency Preparedness
Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
The Michaelian Institute for Public Policy & Management

Pace University
2004
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With the assistance of Whitney Smith

Pace University

2004
The Foundation for Emergency Preparedness

Recognizing that the future of emergency services depends upon coordination and collaboration, The Foundation for Emergency Preparedness was established to develop and promote an informed perspective among executives in police, fire and emergency services. The Foundation’s objective is to identify and deliver strategic, tactical, and creative ideas and models that will strengthen public safety agencies and ultimately allow them to serve their communities better.

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The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is a national membership organization of progressive police executives from the largest city, county and state law enforcement agencies. PERF is dedicated to improving policing and advancing professionalism through research and involvement in public policy debate. Incorporated in 1977, PERF’s primary sources of operating revenues are government grants, contracts, and partnerships with private foundations and other organizations.

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The Edwin G. Michaelian Institute’s mission is to foster the improvement of public and not-for-profit sector management and policy. The Institute, with its affiliate the Municipal Law Resource Center (MLRC), has been responding since 1973 to the needs of public and not-for-profit organizations by conducting a variety of educational workshops, conferences, consulting, and research. Staffed by and housed within Pace University, the Institute also serves as the principal outreach arm of the Master of Public Administration program—part of the Dyson College of Arts and Sciences.

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PREFACE

When we began to envision this summit (held in October 2004), our thoughts were focused on the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Additionally, in the summer of 2004 a battle was brewing in New York City between the police and fire departments over respective responsibility during various emergencies. Moreover, the 9/11 Commission had highlighted the need for improved coordination, collaboration and communication between public safety agencies on the local, state and national level.

As we publish these proceedings in the Autumn of 2005 we are confronted with other dreadful events; this time, however, the tragedy is not man-made but an act of nature: hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As unfortunately evident in the governmental response to Katrina, many of the preparedness issues identified in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks seem unresolved and perhaps even more pressing. Investigations will eventually determine why local, state and federal agencies failed to respond to the devastation that struck the Gulf Coast. However, one thing is clear: issues raised during the summit--incident command, coordination, collaboration and communication between all levels of public safety agencies, public health officials and emergency managers--must be addressed if we are to move forward in our efforts to protect our communities.

The three cooperative models discussed during the summit--Phoenix, Charlotte-Mecklenburg and White Plains--provide viable starting points in the discussion regarding the improvement and integration of local emergency preparedness. Also, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) needs careful examination with regard to its implementation as well as its ability to bring various levels of government together to create a cohesive response. Also to be carefully considered are the surge capacities of health care facilities and the best method of incorporating health providers in the emergency planning process.

We must acknowledge that no single agency or government entity can effectively respond to catastrophic events without the assistance of other public, private and community partners. Academic institutions must also be recognized as important participants and be engaged in the dialogue regarding "all-hazards" planning and implementation. We offer these proceedings as a contribution to a national dialogue regarding one of the most critical issues facing this nation: emergency preparedness.

The articles included herein are directly based upon presentations made at the “Building Sound Homeland Security Foundations: The Local Police-Fire Summit” held at Pace University, New York, on October 14, 2004. This summit is as far as we know the first of its kind and was the by-product of collaboration between the City of White Plains Department of Public Safety, the Police Executive Research Forum, The Foundation for Emergency Preparedness, and Pace University’s Edwin G. Michaelian Institute for Public Policy & Management.
The summit and this resulting publication have three inter-related objectives:

1) To help fire and police executives explore patterns of successful police-fire collaboration that lead to alternative models for addressing emergency and homeland security planning.

2) To identify initial issues in non-critical incident police and fire service delivery that can serve as "building blocks" leading to more expansive planning and service delivery models. Such building blocks may take the form of routine police-fire problem solving communication, more formal “Weed-and-Seed” interaction, safe housing, and joint all-hazards planning, among other identified modes of cooperation.

3) To assist emergency service professionals in identifying collaborative processes that best suit their local environments and that also will result in a foundation for enhanced cooperation and collaborative planning.

We are grateful for the expert participation of all the presenters who made this Summit a highly productive event. Our deep gratitude also needs to be expressed to Richard Esposito of ABC News for moderating the event, to Cliff Karchmer for all his organizational efforts, to Jerome M. Hauer for leading a provocative luncheon keynote address, to Pace University Provost for delivering a heartfelt welcome and introduction to the program, and to Congresswomen Nita M. Lowey for her presence and words of encouragement.

Special thanks go to Michaelian Institute Staff Lorraine Monaco, Susan Daria and Bernice Spina for making pre-arrangements and running the event smoothly. Anthony Sutton, Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Emergency Services, provided crucial organizational support and funding for the conference. Inspector Daniel Jackson, Detective Philip Donnelly and Police Officer Anthony Drago of the City of White Plains Police Department managed and assisted with logistics, mailings, travel arrangements, etc.

We welcome both your feedback on any information found in this publication, or any related ideas you have regarding the enhancement of emergency service cooperation. Thanks for your interest and we hope you find this information useful.

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Frank G. Straub, Ph.D., Commissioner
White Plains Department of Public Safety

White Plains, New York, Autumn 2005
The Joint Incident Command Model of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina

Jerry Sennett and Jeffrey Dulin

Jerry Sennett, Deputy Chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, and Jeff Dulin, Deputy Chief for the Charlotte Fire Department, began their presentation with an introduction to the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and stressed that NIMS is a more advanced version of the same incident management protocol that most jurisdictions typically employ.

Chief Dulin explained the history of Charlotte’s integrated emergency services model. Charlotte has been integrating fire and police emergency services since around 1930, but it became a major priority in the mid-1980’s as the result of both regional growth and a recognition that an integrated emergency services approach was necessary for continuing to produce positive results. Consequently, in 1987, Charlotte developed its first Joint Incident Mobile Command Post, an integrated incident management system, which the fire department had already been implementing for years. Training is now jointly conducted, and the project has been evaluated as a success by both departments.

Overview of Charlotte-Mecklenburg

The population of Charlotte is about 624,000. There are about 270 square miles within the city of Charlotte and 500 square miles in the entire county. Charlotte has 1,015 uniformed firefighters, about 1,524 uniformed CMPD officers, and a third party EMS transport service (“medic”).

Charlotte-Mecklenburg is the second largest financial center in the country after New York. Bank of America and Wachovia are headquartered in Charlotte. These entities own buildings downtown with a majority of their complexes in the center of the city, along with Duke Energy Headquarters. Charlotte is a major thoroughfare for travelers and commuters from Washington, Florida and Atlanta. The city has a major trucking and rail center, immigration problems consistent with those of large cities, and an attractive climate. Charlotte houses the thirty-third largest airport in the country, which is a hub for U.S. Air. It ranks as the 14th busiest airport in take offs and landings and the 19th busiest in passengers in the United States. Over 23 million passengers fly through Charlotte in a year.

Charlotte also has a major telecommunications market. Within the city are standard broadcast news stations such as Fox, CBS, NBC, and ABC. NBC’s 24-hour station, based in Charlotte, produces much of the news for the rest of the country.
There is also an active professional sports industry in Charlotte. Erickson Stadium, now called Bank of America Stadium, have an award-winning football team. The city is in the process of replacing Charlotte Coliseum in order to attract a new NBA team. Lowe's Motor Speedway, in neighboring Cabarrus County northeast of Mecklenburg, hosts popular car races. It attracts many people to the region (180,000 to the fall race) who in turn use Charlotte's dining and accommodation facilities.

Paramount Carowinds, a major theme park on the border of North and South Carolina, is the fastest growing theme park in Paramount’s system and has over a million visitors yearly. It is open throughout the summer and weekends in the spring and the fall but closed during the winter.

With regard to energy and city services, two nuclear plants, run by Duke Energy, exist within 25 miles of downtown Charlotte. Even before 9/11 they were a source of concern for terrorist activity and threats. There is also a major transcontinental pipeline that goes through Charlotte. After 9/11 the police and fire departments were asked to post police officers near the tank farms to protect the area, even though there were no direct threats. Police officers were also stationed near the waste and water treatment plants. A lake in the north part of the county supplies Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s water system. Lake security was a source of concern immediately following 9/11 and remains so today.

THE JOINT INCIDENT COMMAND MODEL

In 1993, Charlotte and Mecklenburg combined their two police departments: the approximately 850-officer Charlotte Police Department, and the Mecklenburg County Police Department, which employed about 250 officers at the time. Currently there are about 1,994 total personnel and 1,500 sworn civilians from the “9-1-1-” communications center, which is housed in the police department’s building. The “9-1-1” communications center is under the command of the Deputy Police Chief, and all such requests for police, fire and medical come directly to the police department. The police department assesses each need and then dispatches the fire or EMS calls to the appropriate response department. Also, housed within the police department is one of two crime labs in the State of North Carolina as well as a helicopter unit.

Additionally, the Police have a canine unit, SWAT team, and a joint police/fire training academy. The academy has been in existence since the mid-1970's and shares a building with all emergency services, thus providing an opportunity for new recruits to get to know existing emergency personnel as soon as they begin their training. Recently, a new academy has been built in the same location, with police and fire personnel on different sides of the same building. The recruits co-mingle frequently, encouraging good relations between the two divisions. Law enforcement and fire wind up working in the same building throughout their careers.
Charlotte police officers also participate in a part-time Hazardous Device Unit as part of their routine responsibilities. Through grant money, asset forfeiture, and other budget line items, the Hazardous Device Unit has purchased the best possible equipment.

The police and fire departments have been able to work closely with and train with military personnel from North Carolina’s numerous military bases. If needed, military personnel will come to Charlotte to assist the police and fire departments with overwhelming situations. Joint training, therefore, ensures smoother operations in the event of an incident, since many of the logistics are worked out well in advance.

Charlotte’s SWAT Team and helicopter unit also train with the fire department. There are five fire captains that work part time, training monthly, with the helicopter unit on rescues. Fire Chief Dulin oversees the helicopter rescue missions for the Fire Department, but the police department also uses fire captains in their helicopter rescue missions. Like the Hazardous Device Unit, the SWAT Team is not a full-time team, but they are well trained and outfitted with the best equipment available.

The Charlotte Fire Department is comprised of more than 1,000 firefighters, thirty-seven engines, thirteen truck companies, two heavy rescues, four Haz Mat units, and six Battalion Chiefs. The minimum on duty strength is approximately 225 and covers the normal traditional fire service roles: fire prevention, fire investigation, and fire suppression. Charlotte Fire Department provides various specialized services, such as a mass decontamination unit that was built in the late 90’s to deal with large-scale decontamination problems. In North Carolina, the state is divided into seven regions that represent Hazardous Materials Response and Bio-Terrorism Response statewide. The Charlotte Fire Department has one of the three Urban Search and Rescue Teams in North Carolina and trains exclusively in Charlotte.

A Mobile Command Unit, built in 1987 under the direction of the police and fire chiefs, is the centerpiece of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg model. Leadership in the departments realized that to get people to work together, they had to be in the same location. So instead of having separate fire and police command vehicles, the administration created a joint vehicle called the Mobile Command Unit. Chairs were labeled for fire and police, EMS and emergency management, and public works. This gave the participants a physical piece of property which, in turn, gave them a stake in the effort to work together. At any event with multi-agency response, the police and fire chiefs required the Mobile Command Unit to be present. They forced the emergency personnel to use it even though it was not always necessary. This exercise laid the groundwork for future partnerships and collaboration.
As a result of these initiatives, emergency personnel have learned to work together. Since 1974, the respective training academies have forced the men and women to know the people on both sides of the building. They eat together in the same lunchroom; they share the same training grounds, and consequently build strong relationships. Chiefs Sennett and Dulin have known each other for over twenty years, and the events of 9-11 reinforced the vital process that they have been following for those twenty years.

**A Test Event**
This close working relationship was crucial when, in 1997, a man walked into Muckamore County Courthouse intending to detonate a bomb. It was the first time in United States history that anybody tried to use a biological dissemination device. The man had attempted to grow Anthrax in his trailer, but his aquarium was set four degrees too cold and he grew botulism instead. He put three bottles of botulism in a briefcase with two pounds of black powder, screws and a remote detonator.

The police and fire departments had to work together to successfully respond to the situation. They initially called the Chemical Biological Response Unit (CBRU) of the Marine Corps for help. CBRU informed the departments that they possessed the same equipment, and that the Charlotte police and fire departments, with their bomb squad and Haz Mat team, were to handle the incident themselves. The collaborative planning, training, and response efforts that Charlotte police and fire departments maintain was vital to the successful resolution of this incident, especially in avoiding overlap and potential confusion.

Charlotte has a Sheriff's Department of 1,000 to 1,200 Sheriff's deputies, with jurisdiction over the jails and courtrooms. When the incident occurred, the Sheriff's Department had immediate jurisdiction, but the police department alerted all of the emergency response teams, including the FBI. The police evacuated the building and then let the Sheriff’s Department deal with the situation. The police, fire, Haz Mat, Sheriff’s Office, and the FBI were all at the scene, so there were many different people trying to make decisions. The lesson learned from this was that although the cooperative framework already in place worked well, the actual implementation still needed improvement.

**Other Cooperative Efforts**
In addition to the Incident Command Post, one of the police and fire departments’ early collaborations was the Joint Fire Investigation Task Force. Formed in 1985, The Joint Fire Investigation Task Force was a combination of Charlotte firefighters or fire investigators, police officers, and representatives from the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). They comprise a team of six fire investigators, four CMPD Arson Detectives, one SBI officer and one AFT agent.
The Task Force was particularly influential in Charlotte’s aggressive approach to dealing with arson during the 1970’s and ’80’s. The Joint Fire Investigation Task Force had a clearance rate of 30%, which is almost twice the national average. This is credited to the fact that a fire investigator and a police investigator work side-by-side on every case, thus eliminating communication lapses and time spent waiting for each other.

In the event of explosions, post-blast analysis responsibility falls upon the fire investigator/police investigator team. From the time the blast occurs or the device is processed, both the fire and police investigators share responsibility for the situation. The joint fire team investigation also handles false alarm fire reports. They investigate about 1,000 fires per year, of which two-thirds are deemed intentionally set.

After the courthouse incident, the police and fire chiefs, the medical director, and the EM Manager created the Advanced Local Emergency Response Team (ALERT) team, the first local task force that incorporated firefighters, law enforcement officers, EMS, physicians, federal, and state partners into one response team. ALERT combines all of the people that would have responsibility at the scene of a major incident, man-made or natural. They initially trained together three times per month every month for the first two years. Now they train quarterly.

Charlotte also utilizes the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), whose goal is to insure that the medical community and the first responders work together. According to federal evaluations, public health and hospitals are the two weakest links in the disaster response and recovery model. Doctors and hospital personnel are on the forefront of decision-making and response protocols. Therefore, they are an integral part of response and recovery because they receive the victims from the first responders.

The ALERT team includes seventy-five Haz Mat technicians, twenty paramedics, five physicians, and receives state and federal support. The Federal EPA is also included in the team, bringing a new and positive dimension to the team’s capabilities. All members of the ALERT team wear the same uniform with the ALERT patch and their respective department’s patch on it. The uniforms show unity while the same time honoring individual professions.

Charlotte’s geographical position on the state line between North and South Carolina makes jurisdiction complicated. To solve this problem, every law enforcement officer was sworn in as a Deputy Federal Marshall. As Deputies, Charlotte law enforcement officers have the authority to cross state lines. Firemen do not have to have federal authorization to work in different regions. Allowing law enforcement officials the same flexibility allowed the Charlotte police force to develop into a more regionally focused outfit.
The ALERT team also provides a mechanism for better security planning for events in Charlotte, such as visits from national and international political and business leaders. Security strategy is pre-planned, with team members knowing beforehand exactly what to do, who is going to do it, and what agency is going to be responsible for coordinating each activity. Also at the Team’s disposal are regional support mechanisms based in Charlotte, such as Haz Mat response, Urban Search and Rescue, Public Help Surveillance, and Hazardous Device Units.

The Charlotte Police and Fire Department built their integrated security and emergency system with the intention of including in the region the entire Charlotte metropolitan area. The buzzword now in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is “regionalism.” Emergency departments must share their resources not only with those in the same city, but also with those in the same region. In the future, less money will be available for emergency services, so the money that does exist will be best applied to broad, regional efforts.

Charlotte also has a Joint Haz Mat Bomb Team. Whenever there is a report of a confirmed device or a confirmed suspicious package, the police department bomb squad immediately requests a Haz Mat Unit. The bomb squad and the Haz Mat technicians have their own specialties, but they work together to address the specific incident and execute a joint entry. Following 9/11, the Charlotte police and fire departments received many reports of suspicious packages and white powder. By participating in cross training, Haz Mat and the bomb unit can share resources and work together efficiently. Haz Mat team members clear the area for radiological or chemical agents. The bomb squad then assumes responsibility for the incident.

In 1987, Charlotte implemented a co-800 MHz radio system. Every firefighter, every police officer, every EMS technician, every emergency management representative, can talk with each other via specific radio channels. The crews communicate constantly and share the same information.

Charlotte also has a distinct 911 emergency call system. 911 operators take calls for fires, forward the calls to a fire dispatcher, and remain on the line. If there is any information that does not reach the fire dispatcher, the 911 dispatcher can pass that information on. The dispatchers are not co-located, but they are co-equipped and co-connected through the phone system and the CAD system.

Police Chief Sennett highlighted an example of the ALERT team’s success. In and around North Carolina, Hezbollah was using cigarette sales to raise money. Following 9/11, the government prosecuted several people involved in Hezbollah, and the trial was held in Charlotte. It was one of the first terrorist-related trials in the country, and it resulted in a conviction. Charlotte Police and Fire Departments received threats, but because integrated emergency strategies had previously been set in place the ALERT Team was easily mobilized well before the trial
began. They fortified the Federal Courthouse, as it is a historical building ill-configured for security. Much communication and collaboration on the part of the fire and police departments was particularly necessary in transporting the prisoners from the jail to the courthouse. Streets had to be closed and traffic re-routed to keep the transportation area closed to the public. Law enforcement had to coordinate with the fire department in order for the Haz Mat team to stage a secure location while the prisoners were being moved and while they were attending the trial. Federal partners were also involved so all events were recorded and watched from closed circuit televisions throughout the city. Through these partnerships, emergency services was better able to respond quickly to potentially dangerous situations.

In terms of written protocols, Charlotte emergency services has an “all hazards book” of about 1,000 pages. All imaginable disasters are listed, with a description of which department should lead the respective initial response, and a list of the responsibilities of all departments. Each individual is assigned a specific role; there is no competition.

Charlotte’s elected officials also echo the emphasis on cooperation. In order to successfully build a culture of cooperation and collaboration, elected leaders must speak the language of cooperation and demonstrate it through their actions. The political leaders in Charlotte were all receptive to the idea of cooperation and collaboration. As a result, the chiefs of different emergency departments in the Charlotte region currently gather to make joint decisions about the allocation of money, resources, and equipment.

**Audience Questions (Modified)**

*Richard Esposito of ABC News (Moderator):*
Since Incident Command is Forward Command and is in itself fragile, how do you manage and oversee the command of the incident itself?

**Sennett:**
- Depends on the situation.
- Firefighters more adept than police officers at incident command better due to manpower in the response vehicle.
- The fire department has taught the police department Incident Command.
- The first person to arrive on the scene will announce over the common radio frequency that they have incident command.
- As others arrive, they know their respective duties, and each person attends to his/her position’s specific tasks.

**Dulin:**
- Everything we do is collaborative.
- We have a Joint Operation Center and joint information sharing.
- The entire philosophy is to work together and collaborate.
Esposito:
How do you manage issues that take place outside the perimeter of an incident? For example, how would you manage the logistics of a nuclear plant meltdown with its enormous variety of collateral effects in that vicinity?

Dulin:
- The Emergency Management Director for the county is the Incident Commander for a multi-jurisdictional incident.
- A unified command presence is under him to support him as needed.

Question from the audience:
You mentioned in your presentation that the hospitals were the weakest link; could you elaborate?

Dulin:
- Traditionally they didn't see themselves as first responders.
- We brought people to them, but they did not have emergency management training.
- Now, however, the hospitals are at the negotiation table with the rest of the emergency services representatives.
- Police and Fire Departments currently share funding with the hospitals.

Question from the audience:
How many dispatchers do you have?

Dulin:
- We bring in different portions of the ALERT team depending on the situation.
- We utilize the ALERT team a couple hundred times per year.
- Everyone on the ALERT team knows how to perform all the basic functions of the respective services, but each member has his/her specialty.

Question from the audience:
Can you explain the upper organizational part? Do the team members ultimately answer to one individual?

Sennett:
- The Police Department rank structure is: officer, detective, sergeant, captain, major, deputy chief, chief.
- The Chief of Police and the Fire Chief report to the City Manager who is not an elected official.
- The Mayor is an elected official, but is not full-time.
- City Council Members in Charlotte are elected officials.
- The City Manager is the person who can hire and fire the chiefs.
**Question from the audience:**
The question concerned training related to the nuclear power plant.

**Dulin:**
- Plants have been in existence for 25 years.
- Annual training in Charlotte for police officers, firefighters, and EMS on the use of a radiological monitor
- Every fire truck carries radiological monitors
- Every ambulance carries protective equipment for dealing with contaminated people.
- Around 500,000 people would be evacuated if either of these plants had an incident.
- Our plans are ever-changing.
- Our biggest concern now is what happens if we have a radiological disbursement device or someone steals some used plutonium and sets it off in downtown Charlotte.

**Sennett:**
- There are in-house security people at the nuclear plants.
- They protect the facility itself from the inside and expect the police department to deal with the threat that is outside.
- The outside is still very well protected.

**Question from the audience:**
How does a change in threat levels affect the status of preparedness?

**Sennett:**
- We do not necessarily change our procedures according to threat levels unless the threat directly affects the Charlotte region.
- We work closely with the FBI, so we have an understanding of the relevance of the threat to Charlotte.
- It is too expensive in money and manpower to rally everyone for threats that do not directly affect us.

**Question from the audience:**
Do you have a union for the fire department?

**Sennett:**
- It is against the law to have a firefighters’ union in North Carolina.
- We do, however, have organizations that represent firefighters and law enforcement (FOP, POP).
- We do not have collective bargaining.

**Question from the audience:**
With respect to the medical field, what kinds of special resources would be available for the first responders?
**Dulin:**
- Every police officer and every paramedic has his/her own personal protective equipment: a respirator, a Tyvec Suit, boots, and gloves.
- All of the equipment is carried on every piece of apparatus, including police cars.
- Those units can form the ALERT Team as needed.

**Question from the audience:**
What additional resources, such as pharmaceuticals, are carried?

**Dulin:**
- Pharmaceuticals are all carried on the Mass Casualty Unit that belongs to the EMS Agency.
- We have a mobile hospital staffed by Carolina’s Medical Center.
- The pharmacy has prepared and stored pre-determined caches of pharmaceuticals.

**Question from the audience:**
Concerning replicating your model, do you see the joint training and joint uniforms as lynchpins in your model? What are three critical strategies for other departments to implement immediately?

**Dulin:**
1. Do not wear uniforms to the first meeting; come in civilian clothes. The unified uniform is a critical part of our model; it was one of the first things we did.
2. Look at new ways of doing things. Understand each position’s distinct responsibilities. Let each position maintain its separate identity.
3. The value of collaboration and cooperation should come from the top down: from the elected officials to the firefighters and street police officers.

**Question from Esposito:**
Your model is silent on the mechanism of the public; why is that and how do you integrate the public into the model?

**Dulin:**
- We involve our public in everything we do.
- On 9/11, we went on live TV and said, "We're prepared, we have this asset, we have the capability to respond to an incident here in Charlotte," to calm the public down.
- Every week we show the cooperation between the Emergency Response Agencies.
- At every incident, we have Public Information Officers from each agency that work very closely on a day-to-day basis sharing information with each other and the public.
• When there is a joint information release, Public Information Officers from each agency speak together.
• This type of teamwork instills professionalism and community confidence in the emergency services system.

Question from the audience:
Why do you use the U.S. Marshals instead of the FBI to obtain cross-state authority?

Sennett:
• The Marshal Service has made this task easier.
• We had more people from the Marshal Service involved on the ALERT Team itself.
• We have deputized Charlotte-Mecklenburg officers in the past to give them authority to work with different task forces throughout the state.

Question from Esposito:
Does the FBI allow people to be deputized?

Dulin:
• Sheriff's Deputies from Mecklenburg County, who are called Mecklenburg Police Officers, are involved with U.S. Marshals in making fugitive arrests and in investigations.
• All of our planning is structured so that we can execute pre-planned maneuvers in everyday affairs.

Question from Cliff Karchmer (Police Executive Research Forum-PERF):
Is Problem Oriented Policing (POP) one of the foundation steps for this collaboration? Does the fire service play a role at all in POP, or could it?

Sennett:
• Problem Oriented Policing is part of our philosophy.
• POP is trying to solve problems before they happen.
• The fire department is also part of POP.
• The ALERT Team is a result of POP.

Question from the audience:
If you have simultaneous incidents, what do you do?

Dulin:
• We have multiple capabilities.
• One thing that we have always done in Charlotte is build redundancy, so we can respond to multiple incidents simultaneously.
• We have two Urban Search and Rescue Capabilities in Charlotte; we send one out of town for State deployment, and we keep one in town.
Question from the audience:
In your model, do you know how many patients you can handle for search capacity and how many patients you could deal with if you had multiple incidents or one catastrophic incident?

Dulin:
- We do not know.

Question from Esposito:
If there’s a mass incident or multiple incidents, what’s the capacity of your hospital intakes, surge capacity, and the maximum volume they can take in a short period of time? And have you studied that?

Dulin:
- It’s probably similar to other hospital systems.
- We have four major hospitals in Charlotte, and they can probably contain the first two or three hundred patients.
- If there were more patients, we would activate the Mobile Hospital, which can handle about one hundred patients.
- We have a regional system in North Carolina where we can send people within a fifty to one hundred or 200-mile radius.
- We are also part of the NDMS System in Charlotte and the Strategic National Stockpile.
- We were one of the first regions to test our NDMS System.

Question from the audience:
How do these special teams deal with malfunctioning alarm systems?

Dulin:
- We do not respond to un-confirmed fire alarms.
- If we have fifty per cent of our companies committed, we go to non-answering fire alarms.
- Life safety is more important than building safety.
- The police department has a very aggressive program for burglar alarms.

Esposito closed the session, mentioning that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg police and fire departments are experts on the cost and management of acquisition. The police and fire departments sometimes conduct the acquisition together.
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Arnold M. Howitt

Post 9/11, terrorism and the threat of weapons of mass destruction have arisen as crucial issues. As terrorism has demanded the attention of emergency responders, the emergency services community has developed a greater sensitivity to the demands placed on emergency response personnel in non-terrorist-related emergency situations. Such situations include natural disasters, technology failures, industrial accidents, major transportation accidents, and the spread of emergent infectious diseases such as West Nile Virus and SARS. 9/11 and other major emergency incidents have heightened the awareness that public safety agencies must cooperate with each other more effectively than they have in the past.

We will address the following questions and topics relevant to the development of an Incident Management System:

1. The Demands of Crises
2. The Specifics of Incident Management Systems
3. Diffusing Incident Management Systems Across Professions and Across Jurisdictions
4. Limitations in Incident Management Systems
5. The Future of Incident Management Systems

Most of the ideas presented herein have emerged in discussions with Professor Dutch Leonard at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and represent the joint product of our work. These ideas are also crucially dependent on the insights, knowledge, and experience culled from participation in a variety of discussions with professionals, experts and academics, similar to those present in this summit.

1. THE DEMANDS OF CRISES: WHAT DO CRISIS SITUATIONS, AS OPPOSED TO “EVERYDAY” EMERGENCIES; THE DEMAND OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

In a crisis situation, organizations must respond creatively to high stakes and tense demands under novel circumstances. Protecting lives is critical, damage may occur, services must be restored, and the people of our communities must be cared for. In these kinds of extreme events, however, emergency responders operating in traditional environments often find that the normal chains of command and existing operating practices are poorly suited to the problems that present themselves. Given the scale of action, which tends to be much greater than under normal circumstances, responders often have to work with organizations and people with whom they have never before collaborated. This occurred on September 11th and has been evident in other situations as well.
Under such conditions, how can emergency personnel operate effectively? The Incident Management System has developed, particularly in the fire service, over the past thirty to thirty-five years as a flexible way of responding to these kinds of crisis demands. It has been used in a variety of venues, from rural and urban wildfires to hospital emergencies and industrial explosions, earthquakes, hostage takings, and blackouts. The utility of IMS beyond the fire setting has been demonstrated, but only in isolated instances.

When the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated and strewed wreckage across a number of states in the southwest, the U.S. Forest Service was the agency summoned to coordinate the search for debris. Why was it that the U.S. Forest Service was called upon? Because, as some of the premier practitioners of Incident Management in the country, they knew how to assemble a group of people and assign them tasks to thoroughly search the area. They knew how to maintain large numbers of personnel in the field and to provide them with food, portable toilets, sleeping facilities—everything that they needed. They also knew how to cooperate across emergency service boundaries. The U.S. Forest Service, because of its broad experience in Incident Management, was the agency most suited to orchestrating the search.

The basic functional structure of IMS is simple. It can operate in a variety of circumstances, from a small, routine incident to larger, perhaps multi-site situations. The National Incident Fire Center in Boise, Idaho operates an Incident Management-related system that coordinates the response to dozens of forest fires that occur in the Western United States every year. They deploy tens of thousands of firefighters to a large number of sites where they extensively use Incident Management.

NIMS, required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and by President Bush’s HSPD #5, attempts to implement Incident Management across agencies. There is an incentive to comply, as following NIMS is a condition required to receive Federal grant funds. In terms of technical success, IMS will not be difficult for most jurisdictions to implement. Achieving the spirit of NIMS, however, is a greater challenge. The relevant questions are: can IMS be expanded into something that fulfills the spirit of NIMS? Is this system well suited for dealing with new and more demanding challenges? What obstacles to implementation lie ahead?

**Normal Operations, Routine Emergencies, Crises**

Emergency personnel operate along a continuum that begins with everyday, ordinary operations and extends to large scale, true crises. An example of a normal operation is dealing with daily traffic problems in rush hour. Normal operations have relatively low stakes, are largely predictable, and handled by triggering programmed action. There exist written plans and people trained to handle such operations. Those programmed actions are used every day and implemented with ease when dealing with normal operation situations.
There are also routine emergencies. These are not routine in the sense of danger; they occur at unpredictable times, are sudden and unplanned, and tend to have much higher stakes. Critically, the outcomes achieved in these kinds of emergencies depend on the quality of the decisions made. There is a high degree of contingency, however: if police and fire officials do the right things, positive outcomes will result, but the performance of the wrong actions may result in negative outcomes.

What increases routine emergencies’ difficulty even more is that they require urgent action. Even in these routine, yet quite serious, emergencies, many of their general features can be anticipated. For example, police agencies can predict things that may occur in an in-progress bank robbery or a hostage taking. Firefighters know that severe fires fall into certain categories, and they are prepared accordingly. Even if the exact details of a given setting are unpredictable, there are general programs and action plans that one can prepare. One can put those contingency measures in place and adapt them as necessary. This is similar to Charlotte’s multi-usage of the ALERT System.

The third category of emergency is the “true crisis”, and these incidents make this summit necessary. These are, like routine emergencies, sudden and unplanned. They often have even higher stakes. There is also a high degree of contingency in the sense that the quality of the outcome, whether it is positive or negative, depends on what the police or firemen decide to do.

What differentiates the true crisis from other operations is that there are significant elements of novelty. A true crisis is something never faced before, with which we have no experience, except in the most general fashion. If there were to be a serious nuclear accident in Charlotte, it would be a true crisis situation where the response would not be absolutely certain.

The second point about the true crisis is that some of the prepared and programmed actions may be inadequate for dealing with such novel situations. They may even prove counter-productive, putting people at risk if implemented. Police officers often refer to themselves as the “blue canaries,” recognizing that if there is a bio-terrorism crisis in a subway or an enclosed building, they would rush inside and do exactly as they are trained to. This may put them in jeopardy, perhaps even sealing their doom by doing as they have been trained.

These crises, with their considerable elements of novelty and their potential for producing counter-productive results if pre-determined strategies are utilized, are what make this summit necessary. These are elements that emergency personnel need to understand and be able to appropriately address, both for the protection of our citizens and for the protection of the people who work in our agencies, for whom we are ultimately responsible.
To prepare for these kinds of crises, emergency personnel should develop skills in problem diagnosis. How does one recognize novelty? How does one know with what specific problem one is faced? Emergency personnel need improvisation skills in order to develop new approaches to new situations on the spot, as well as improved communication methods with each other responder as they operate on the scene(s). Also needed is practiced collaborative action of the sort possessed by Charlotte, Phoenix, and White Plains.

Responses and Preparation
The action requisites for each kind of emergency are quite different. For normal operations, emergency personnel simply employ the routines that have been previously developed. For routine emergencies, they have easily modified plans that can be easily adapted at the outset to fit any situation. They can stage drills and practice those plans to be ready for various situations. In true crises, however, a different set of reserve skills of diagnosis, improvisation, communication and collaborative action is needed. These types of crises push agencies beyond what they have been prepared for in the past. It is in this sense that 9/11 was an alarm for the emergency services industry, not just for terrorism but for the whole range of eventualities that might require emergency service personnel to go beyond their daily operations.

Characteristics of Future Crises
Future crises will have some characteristics that are quite different from those dealt with in the past. They may be emergencies extending over long periods of time. If there were an emergent infectious disease that began to spread, it could take months or even years to deal with some of the issues that may evolve. There could be enormous strains on personnel and resources that exceed what is experienced in for example a serious fire or during a major public event.

Another potential differing characteristic is the possibility of geographically extended emergencies that cross jurisdictional boundaries, going beyond our cities and counties. Therefore, the involvement of multiple jurisdictions, multiple levels of government, and new parts of the private sector will be quite extraordinary.

A third feature of these extraordinary crises is their potential to take the form of new kinds of threats, such as bio-terrorism and cyber-terrorism. Cyber-terrorism might damage some of the computer systems upon which emergency personnel depend, such as our communication systems and our control systems. Some of these crises will have very unpredictable timeframes. Bio-terrorism will have no obvious epicenter compared to events like fires, explosions or bank robberies, where there is an obvious center of the action. Disease may be widespread, and traditional emergency response agencies, like police, fire or emergency management may not be prepared to take the lead. Public health agencies may need to step forward and/or play very significant roles that they have heretofore never assumed and for which they are not prepared.
The novel characteristics of the crises of focus, extended duration, broader geographic scope, and new threat types multiply enormously the need for coordination and cooperation among response agencies and jurisdictions. And all of this is necessary to protect the public, pool resources and skills, and protect public safety workers in these kinds of situations.

2. THE SPECIFICS OF INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: DO IMS APPROACHES MEET THE NEEDS THAT THOSE CRISSES PRODUCE?

Examples - Los Angeles Riots and Pentagon Fire

IMS is a system that provides a flexible management structure or template. This structure allows organizations to develop and implement the kinds of skills needed to address the novelty of crisis conditions and to devise tactics that provide an effective response to those kinds of situations. The importance of IMS can be illustrated by two experiences that stand as opposing examples of the way to approach such a crisis.

The Los Angeles Riot of 1992 was the worst civil disorder in 20th Century history and left more than 50 people dead and billions of dollars of damaged property. Enormous conflict existed between police and fire operations, some of it overt, some of it simply occurring in the course of operations. There was also a great deal of conflict between the LAPD and the L.A. County Sheriff's Office, which provided policing services for the rest of L.A. County.

What was revealed in some of the after-action reports and studies was that there was very poor prior preparation for a major disaster, despite the fact that the city had experienced a major riot in 1965. Factors contributing to this second riot included weak senior leadership, particularly in the police department but in other agencies as well, turf battles between the response agencies, poor decisions made at several stages of the crisis, operational delays, and most tellingly, very slow scale-up from the initial location of the riot to a larger geographic area. Further, there was an ineffective division of responsibility when the National Guard was summoned and arrived in L.A. There was no mission carved out for the National Guard, nor a plan of how they would be absorbed into the current police strategy. In addition, there were similar problems with some of the other response agencies, inadequate communication, and very weak coordination among the agencies that were called out.

This crisis was a tremendous blow to the country. The situation could have been more easily controlled if the L.A. Emergency Response Agencies had utilized IMS techniques. They were in the process of developing the SEM System which California has since implemented. This riot was one of the incidents, along with other crises in California, drove the state to develop the system.
The 2001 Pentagon attack was a horrific assault on the center of our national military command system. It is the second example of a true crisis and produced an opposite experience from that of the Los Angeles Riots. At the Pentagon there was a moment when Secretary Rumsfeld was outside the building, surveying the damage, marching around like the Field Marshal that he is and imagines himself to be. One of the officers put his arm around Secretary Rumsfeld and, pointing at Jim Schwartz, Assistant Fire Chief (now Chief) of the Arlington County Fire Department, said, "Mr. Secretary, today he’s in charge." Assistant Chief Schwartz was the Incident Commander at the Pentagon that day and the following ten days. He ran the response, which was largely a firefighting and hazardous materials and rescue response situation.

Arlington County has 200,000 people and a modest fire department, but they had used Incident Command extensively. They had worked closely with surrounding counties in Virginia, and the Incident Management approach allowed them to coordinate not only with the local response agencies that had primary responsibility, but also with federal agencies and the FBI. They had a practiced system, effective leadership, and effective allocation of responsibility that could absorb as many volunteers as showed up at the site and assign them to useful work; they successfully scaled up to a very large operation, larger than anything they had done before, and they had operational coordination across the agencies and jurisdictions that arrived on the scene. Though the District of Columbia Fire Department was self-dispatched and refused to submit to the Incident Management System, there were very few turf battles. Coordinators were very resourceful in problem solving when issues arose, such as the need of the Pentagon to continue to function and the possibility that there would be another incoming airplane.

Advantages of IMS
The advantages of implementing IMS in crises, such as the 2003 Staten Island Ferry Crash in New York City, include rapid deployment and execution, the ability to factor very complicated systems into separate tasks, and the ability to clearly assign responsibility to specific people so there is no confusion about people’s roles. No issues are left unattended to, as there is structure in place for coordination. Another benefit is the establishment of a clear chain of command and thoughtful attention to the span of control issues so that no commander is supervising a wider geographic area or number of people than is efficient. This is a way of institutionally deciding where to allocate scarce resources, how to distribute equipment, and how to deploy labor.

The structure also encourages the improvisation that is critical for responding to the novel elements of a true crisis and allows for the customization of prepared strategies. In novel situations, such plans are not completely irrelevant; they simply need to be reconstituted to better address the issues at hand. They form the basis of what we can accomplish, setting a repertoire of capabilities that
can be called upon. It is essential to use them, however, in a manner that is not counter-productive to the goal.

IMS utilizes methods by which it promotes the systematic flow of information, which can help solve problems with manpower and command situations. It permits replacements and relief for people who are exhausted due to overwork without rest. Additionally, when a crisis breaks out, the people assigned to command roles might not be present. IMS prepares people to assume leadership responsibilities even if they are not the people that were originally assigned to such roles.

Flexibility is a major element in the Charlotte integrated services model. With the flexibility needed to adapt to new situations, emergency service personnel can apply their respective multiple skills to diverse causes of incidents. They can respond to different sizes of incidents; the modularity and scalability of this approach allows fluidity between small incidents and greater scale incidents. The complexity of several different situations occurring in dispersed geographic areas can thus be controlled with relative ease.

Standardization, also referred to in the Charlotte model, is a critical element of IMS. Cross training and familiarity with terminology, organizational systems, and decision-making processes gives people knowledge about their colleagues’ respective agency operations. Thus, people can provide basic support without complicating matters. Their own activities and skills can be efficiently coordinated; they have the ability to provide services that span across professions, organizations, and jurisdictions.

The IMS system has a huge potential, some of which has been realized, for success. The degree of its adoption from one jurisdiction to another, however, has varied. There are jurisdictions such as the ones presented at this summit that have successfully embraced the IMS concept. There are also many places around the country where IMS is either not used or is the domain of the firefighting and EMS units.

3. DIFFUSING IMS ACROSS PROFESSIONS AND JURISDICTIONS

The challenge, both in thinking about individual jurisdictions and thinking about the larger issue of the National Incident Management System, is how to diffuse both this system and its operators’ respective skills across professions and jurisdictions. There are some responders, such as law enforcement, public health, and hospital systems that have been at best skeptical about IMS, and often quite resistant to it. These professions need to be “brought into the fold,” trained, and integrated into the system. NIMS faces some daunting challenges in seeking to fulfill its founders’ dreams of becoming a true National Emergency Response System that both penetrates jurisdiction boundaries and integrates emergency responders.
There is some resistance and skepticism to NIMS, especially in police organizations and public health agencies. In firefighting, however, NIMS has been well received. There is a clear need for command, for clarity of command and the allocation of responsibility and directing personnel. There is a need for collaboration among different units of a fire department that might be called out for a major fire, and also with mutual aid providers. Firefighters use mutual aid on a regular basis and some mutual aid providers may never have worked together. Therefore, there needs to be a system that unifies these providers and has flexibility of response in directing large numbers of personnel. Fires may be of different types; they certainly occur on many different scales. There is a need for a system that is flexible and scalable enough to compensate for different kinds of fire situations. Always present is the problem of allocating scarce resources of personnel and equipment, not only for the emergency at hand, but for the emergencies that might break out.

So for firefighting, IMS approaches--or ICS as it has been called in the firefighting profession, clearly answers a pressing need of the profession. If the question of the necessity of IMS were asked of law enforcement, however, the answer would be less certain. Compared to firefighting, law enforcement works much less frequently in large coordinated units, there is much less collaboration among work units, mutual aid in policing is extremely rare, and the need for rapidly scalable methods of operation, although sometimes present in police work, is not as frequently needed. It is quite natural that, for police and law enforcement in general, IMS may seem less compelling and opportunities for its use are certainly less apparent and less frequent than for firefighters.

Diffusion is also problematic for other emergency response professions, particularly public health and hospitals. There is something rooted in the nature of the tasks that these professional organizations perform that makes conforming to NIMS a more difficult problem than is readily apparent. In order to diffuse IMS and create NIMS effectively, the case is going to have to be made in these professions for its necessity and benefit, and incentives are going to have to be provided for these professions, including the opportunity to develop IMS-related skills and the confidence to use those skills.

**Benefits of Integrated Services**

West Nile Virus appeared in New York City in 1999. It was a deadly new virus, borne by mosquitoes that required the City of New York to very rapidly organize a major spray for mosquitoes to kill the disease carriers. The response to the situation was led by the City's Office of Emergency Management in partnership with the Department of Health, using IMS-like systems that New York had previously established. The City had been working on systems that integrated with the Health Department for several years prior to 1999, largely motivated by bio-terrorism concerns.
Nominally, the Health Department had the legal authority to act on this issue, but mosquito spraying in New York City had not been conducted since yellow fever prevention in the early 20th Century. There was literally nobody in New York City Government who had ever sprayed for mosquitoes. In this situation posed three challenges: a brand new virus, response capabilities that the City did not possess in-house, and the need to respond rapidly to this novel situation.

The approach that the City took had a number of important advantages that show the potential of IMS. Prior relationships among the agencies and among the emergency responders existed to the extent that the leaders of these agencies had been working together, exercising, drilling, planning together, and practicing tabletops. There was effective assignment of responsibility and strong inter-departmental coordination. There was very successful improvisation based on their previous planning and drilling hypothetical bio-terrorism attacks. Due to scarce resources, responsible resource allocation was crucial. Resources were borrowed from other jurisdictions: Suffolk, Nassau, and possibly Westchester County donated additional supplies. The initial decision was to spray only one borough of New York, already a very large, daunting task. Relatively quickly it became apparent that the entire city had to be sprayed. Thus, the ability to scale up quickly was a critical element to successfully spraying the other four boroughs.

4. LIMITATIONS TO IMS

There are a few limitations to the IMS approach. Limitations particularly come in situations where there are very complex missions and where there are multiple goals that must be prioritized. A very experienced practitioner of IMS, Jim Schwartz, the Incident Commander at the Pentagon, said, “The dirty secret of Unified Command is that there really needs to be a single Incident Commander for it to work.” They The Pentagon had a Unified Command System, but Schwartz was the ultimate commander. In many IMS instances there is a committee structure but also an implicit or explicit assignment to a single person.

The issue of complexity goes beyond the question of who is in charge of the operational elements. It gets at the fundamental problem, which is the difficulty of keeping a mission coherent and consistent as the number of stakeholders who have some claim to authority gets larger and larger. The mission then becomes more complex for each person and response organization involved.

It is known that IMS is an extremely effective technical tool for leadership and crisis management. In many of the situations mentioned previously, such as the Pentagon fire, saving lives, extinguishing the fire, and allowing the National Military Command Structure to operate, were a relatively straightforward set of goals. Nobody disputed the goals or their priority. The challenge was identifying the most effective technical means to accomplish these goals, coordinate resources, and allocate those resources in a sensible way.
There are problems in large-scale crisis responses that have arisen because practitioners have to prioritize competing goals or decide even that some objectives cannot be achieved. In the summer of 2003, Southern California suffered from about a dozen major forest fires occurring practically simultaneously over a six to eight week period. Some of those fires were extremely severe and, though occurring in wild land, threatened towns, structures, vacation homes and regular settlements. The fires spanned jurisdictions, causing great confusion. Politicians interfered, volunteering military personnel from the threatened districts to assist with firefighting and trying to get priority for their districts. The professionals running the operation, the Incident Command Structure, and the fire system did not want untrained people performing very complicated aerial operations with equipment that they had never used.

In this instance, as in many others that involve the fire service and the wild land fire service, there were competing objectives. Choices as to whether or not to stop a fire due to ineffective tactics existed. How can one decide where to spend resources if there are problems in several different jurisdictions but not enough resources to address every problem? Such decisions extend beyond the scope of most emergency response officials' training. Political decision makers are the people who have been elected to make these kinds of decisions. Many discussions and disputes about the tension between politicians’ and emergency responders’ decisions are coming to light in the context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is the appropriate division between military decisions and political decisions made by the civilian leaders of defense departments, President Bush, and Congress?

If there were to be a major new crisis, such as a horrible infectious disease or a nuclear terrorist attack, there should be a political decision-making structure in place. This would allow such decisions to be made legitimately, not with the pretense that they are technical decisions. NIMS was designed to be a technical response system, but there is no parallel political structure in place.

5. THE FUTURE OF NIMS

What is the future of NIMS? First, there are professional domains, such as firefighting, emergency management, EMS, policing, public health and hospitals, Public Works, and the legal system, in which IMS needs to be adopted. Multiple jurisdictions might be involved at this level, as an emergency might affect an individual city, expand into neighboring communities, or affect an entire metropolitan or interstate area. Thus far, many jurisdictions utilize NIMS for firefighting, emergency management and EMS, and it is becoming more common in policing. There is still much to be done for NIMS to fully encompass policing, public health, and hospitals.
Politically, the IMS structure is uncertain. At the city level, it is the Emergency Operating Center structure. The city and county levels are probably the best places to handle political issues related to emergency situations. There, the division of roles has been thoughtfully designed. Although rhetoric sometimes suggests that politicians will leave emergency professionals completely alone to do their tasks, there are situations in which political decision-making is critical.

The political structure for making decisions, such as goal and priority setting functions and value choices, is not yet in place. There is no political system to handle situations that span multiple communities or encompass an entire metropolitan region. The connections between the technical and political processes are not addressed by NIMS. There are pages in NIMS that vaguely allude to this, but it is not sufficiently outlined.

These tasks involve systems management, as there are time systems development problems that are extremely problematic and time intensive. Not only does developing such systems require the coordination of a large number of organizations, it requires educating all participants and members of these organizations to ensure that the innovations penetrate the working environment and the culture of the organization.

**How to begin implementing NIMS**

At an individual response agency or city level, there are a number of things that can be done to begin to implement NIMS. One should consider the endorsement of the need and the focused attention by senior leaders; political and departmental leadership is the essential first step. Secondly, effective applications of NIMS must be showcased. This will persuade mid-level commanders, rank and file officers and response officials of the efficacy and crucial nature of these systems that may make the difference between saving lives of both public and responders, and disaster.

Recognition and reward for commitment should be given to participants or agencies. The people who initiate NIMS systems should be given recognition, and people who have been successful in this and promoted should be given departmental awards to signal the importance of their accomplishments. The system should then be reinforced through training, exercising, and application in everyday situations. There are ways in which these skills can be utilized regularly in the work of the organization (think of the Charlotte experience) so that people become familiar with and committed to them, genuinely believing in their beneficial nature.

There is also an important role for professional associations to play, PERF being a perfect example. Here too endorsement of the need is critical, showcasing best practices. This conference is a paradigmatic example of the way the ideas should be promoted. Professional associations, particularly in the areas that have not traditionally used IMS approaches, need to devise system modifications so that
the particular system effectively works for each profession. There needs to be some flexibility and redesigning, similar to the changes instigated when the California fires graduated from wild land to urban areas.

Training, certification and accreditation, and the Federal Government have an important role to play. These should be issues for regulatory mandates that receive national attention and demand a response from all levels of government. More fiscal incentives should be available to compensate for the real costs that agencies incur for technical assistance and training, deploying people, and implementing planning exercises.

All of these issues will be noted in next years’ development project. It will take a decade to establish a truly effective and functioning Nationally Managed Incident Management System. However, it can be done now in individual jurisdictions, and it is very gratifying to see the wide participation of people in today’s summit.

**Audience Questions (Modified)**

Richard Esposito of ABC News opened the question/answer session by prompting the audience to ask questions concerning the lead role of health officials in emergency situations.

*Question from the audience:*
Regarding the slide presenting shortcomings and politics in terms of setting priorities in a large-scale incident, are there established protocols for dealing with intergovernmental issues among elected officials?

*Dr. Howitt:*
- In general these are issues that have to be thought out, particularly the way of managing cross-municipal relationships.
- In the United States we have strong mid – Local Government, strong State Governments, and an effective Federal Government, but the crosscutting regional institutions are extraordinarily weak.
- In some instances, strong counties can compensate for weak regional government to some degree.
- There is still no structure for inter-municipal decision making, especially at the policy-making level.

*Person in the audience added:*
One must take into consideration the National Response Plan, which addresses the issue of connections between federal and state governments. It would be beneficial to connect NIMS, which clearly is tactical and designed for incidents of national significance, with the architecture and functions of the NRP.

*Question from the audience:*
What is the first step in getting this type of integrated services program instituted on a county level? Where would we move through the initial political process?
Dr. Howitt:
• The local response and the local customization that is possible is an asset and an advantage of the way the system is structured.
• That does not obviate the need for having more cooperation.
• The early stages include someone taking the lead in organizing, convening meetings for discussion of this issue, and discussing the reasons why cooperation is difficult in a particular setting.
• If there are legal obstacles that need to be addressed, those sometimes are mutual aid obstacles and the state in enabling acts.
• In California where the SEM System is, the question of who pays for aid can frequently be an issue.
• There needs to be an examination of what are the disincentives for cooperation; in most cases it is not bureaucratic resistance, but reasons that make sense that stand in the way of cooperation.
• If these issues are identified and diagnosed and people start thinking about how such obstacles can be overcome, progress can be made.

Question from the audience:
Do integrated exercises help in clarifying the role of political/elected officials?

Dr. Howitt
• There is a lot of benefit to doing tabletop drills and exercises.
• There are several jurisdictions that tactically responded quickly and well to the events of September 11.
• The political leadership of the community was not sure of their role.
• The tactical agencies are used to doing drilling and exercising and tabletop drills.
• It is essential to engage political officials in the planning, because their critical decisions regarding resources, for example vaccines, will have a direct effect on the emergency effort.

Comment from the audience:
A good example to learn from is how the utilities respond in a large-scale event and also to smaller events such as localized outages.

Dr. Howitt:
• I did not dwell on the private sector because this is largely a public sector audience.
• However, it’s important to look at the roles of people who provide services that have to be restored immediately, such as utilities and transportation, and how these roles are integrated.
• There is also a private sector that backs up the public safety response agencies.
• Harvard University has its own transportation system, medical infirmary facility with physicians, environmental personnel, etc., and many other large organizations in the private sector have similar kinds of components.
We have construction equipment that the university owns.
All of that ought to be part of the planning process.
Institutions in a severe public safety crisis would most likely contribute their efforts, people, and resources to help the community at large.
These institutions should be incorporated in the planning and inventory.
Responders should know what resources exist and how to deploy them.

Question from Jeffrey Dulin of Charlotte-Mecklenburg
We should form a State Emergency Management region-wide program to oversee these large-scale events. Twenty-five counties would then fall under one decision making group that could distribute their pooled resources.

Dr. Howitt:
That is a critical model.
States that have lots of experience with natural disasters are at an advantage because they have experience dealing with large-scale problems.
THE JOINT HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU
IN PHOENIX, ARIZONA

T.J. Martin
John Maldonado

John Maldonado, the Phoenix Deputy Fire Chief, conducted the presentation with Commander T.J. Martin and explained Phoenix’s development of the Homeland Defense Bureau, which extends to the regional medical system, the private sector, attorneys’ offices, and politicians.

The Phoenix Police and Fire Departments have been working closely together for an extended period of time. The Police Chief, Jack Harris, and the Fire Chief, Allen Brunicini, have a strong working relationship; they frequently lunch in public places and strategize. This is an example of the partnerships that are responsible for the Phoenix model’s success. Commander Martin wears a Homeland Defense shirt, rather than a police department shirt. This simple uniform expresses the unity of emergency services divisions under the Homeland Defense Bureau.

OVERVIEW OF PHOENIX
Arizona is a vast, geographically diverse state. In two hours, one can drive from snow skiing terrain in Northern Arizona to water skiing lakes in Phoenix. Phoenix is the fifth largest city in the United States. The busy airport is located in the center of town. Phoenix’s downtown has expanded with the development of many tall buildings, and its suburbs have grown as well. Located at the center of Maricopa County, Phoenix encompasses 512 square miles and accounts for 60% of the county.

The nation’s largest nuclear power plant resides immediately outside of Phoenix. In addition, chemical tank farms located in the middle of West Phoenix neighborhoods have attracted the attention of federal agents. They are potentially hazardous, as someone could easily disrupt one while remodeling or installing plumbing. Phoenix has had difficulty with local criminals burglarizing the area. A chemical tank accident would massively crowd hospitals, among other disastrous effects.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHOENIX HOMELAND DEFENSE BUREAU
The Homeland Defense Planning Advisory Team was conceived of on February 3, 2003. The Police Chief at the time, Harold Hurt, and Fire Chief Brunicini met at a downtown Phoenix restaurant, and mapped out a plan for a Homeland Defense Bureau on the back of a napkin. They declared that the city needed an institution that combined fire and police services. They brought together Commander Martin, former Deputy Fire Chief Don Hendlebren, and representatives from
public health and emergency management to form the Phoenix Homeland Defense Bureau.

Phoenix’s Police Department and Fire Department met regularly to evaluate the progress of the Homeland Defense Bureau. In analyzing their capabilities, they reached the conclusion that the system functioned superbly for prevention, response, and communication, but it lacked in recovery capabilities. To bridge this gap, the Bureau invited Public Health and the Office of Emergency Management to join as entities that could provide recovery services. Representatives of Phoenix’s fifteen hospitals were also invited to participate in Homeland Defense Bureau’s bi-monthly meetings, where they presented reports on standards issued by the Bureau, such as PPE and decontamination levels.

The Homeland Defense Bureau was operational from the start. When the planning meeting convened, it was the first day the country was raised to threat level orange. Orange presented several challenges. For example, it required the Homeland Defense Bureau to develop instantaneous plans, such as implementing new screening procedures at the airport. Six suburban jurisdictions lent officers to assist in the increase of security.

It was a sudden but successful plunge into integrated emergency prevention. Participants learned to improvise. In response to roadblocks, the Homeland Defense Bureau assigned the Fire Department’s roving paramedic bicycle teams to patrol inside the hospitals’ perimeters. They created the Arizona Counter Intelligence Information Center (ACTIC), which houses the FBI, ATF, Military, Fire, and Police personnel in one building where all departments can continuously share information.

The Intelligence Programs Manager is a fire captain who works directly for Chief Maldonado. He is also the Bureau military representation, having recently returned from Iraq where he was the primary officer in charge of counterterrorism for the United States Marine Corps. His military clearances have been a great asset in prevention and intelligence gathering for the Police Department.

Phoenix has one of the nineteen full-time bomb squads in the United States. Members are dedicated entirely to the squad—they do not have any exterior police or fire duties. The group is co-located with the Phoenix Fire Department Special Operations Unit (Haz Mat) technical rescue personnel. The interpersonal relationships between the teams has been brought about through physical proximity. This has aided in the delivery of quality, comprehensive emergency services to the citizens of Phoenix.

Since 1985, the Phoenix Fire Department has run all of the emergency transportation services for the city, including ambulances. Each ambulance has a minimum of one EMT and one firefighter aboard, and some of the constant staffing ambulances carry five paramedics.
The Public Health Manager's office is situated between the offices of Commander Martin and Chief Maldonado’s. The Public Health Manager, Sherry Gibbons, has Master’s degrees in Public Health and Nursing and previously worked as a nurse practitioner. She works with the fifteen hospitals inside the City of Phoenix and the twenty-six hospitals total in the Valley of the Sun. Gibbons performs all duties for public health coordination efforts and has frequent meetings with all of the hospitals in the county and state. At these meetings, the hospitals and Gibbons convene to discuss emergency medicine. For example, she built a formula (sometimes called an algorithm by other jurisdictions) for responding to SARS. How does a city handle SARS victims that enter the city via plane? How does one track the virus and notify the CDC? She planned solutions to these challenges well in advance. The formula has been implemented in several instances and proved successful.

**Partnerships**

Partnerships have been critical, and to make these work, individuals must abandon their egos to plan together and discuss joint issues. As in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, separate departments must forge partnerships with people and organizations with which they have never interacted. This is not always an easy task for law enforcement. For a twenty-two year veteran cop, it is difficult to suddenly agree to share information with different departments.

Sharing intelligence with the fire department was a defining moment in the integrated services model’s development. It is helpful for the fire department to know the history of the houses they visit in response to heart attacks and normal EMS calls. The fire department would additionally want to know if the police department had been previously called to a particular scene to deal with, for example, domestic violence at the house. The fire department’s response actions would then be altered if the police department informed them that a house had been previously used as a methamphetamine lab. So the existing linkages between the fire and police departments have been strengthened by sharing both their office building and their respective information regarding overlapping issues; mutual problem solving is now a natural extension of this interaction.

There are many jurisdictions that both encourage meetings between departments and form committees to address certain issues. Reaching beyond the scheduling of regular meetings to making decisions about sharing office space has been highly beneficial for the Phoenix Homeland Defense Bureau. Issues arise without warning, and working in close proximity allows for collaborative action and personal meetings the moment a problem occurs. Having the Public Health Manager, the Intel Officer, and two FBI representatives present opens a new avenue of assets.

The private sector has been a very helpful partner. There is a “safe business network” that helps communicate intelligence to the businesses in downtown
Phoenix. Phoenix has a large and growing core. The Mayor, along with the City Council and the City Manager, are incredibly supportive of both the Homeland Defense Bureau and business growth in downtown Phoenix. Strong business growth is impossible in a city ridden with crime and poorly equipped with emergency services. Crime prevention and quality emergency services are in the best interest of every sector of the city. Phoenix has accomplished wide crime prevention through the development of strong partnerships, which began with information sharing.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL
The Bureau was the link between the major Police and Fire Departments and between Bureau divisions and sub-departments. The police and fire departments must maintain autonomy; police officers and firefighters have different interests, training, and expertise. However, there are intersection points between duties and issues that face both departments. The Phoenix Homeland Defense Bureau strives to embrace and spotlight those specific areas of expertise and to encourage learning from each other.

With regards to the national model, the Bureau has been repeatedly asked how its model functions practically. How do the departments physically live together in the same office? Do they get along? In any major city, how do police officers, firefighters, and EMS personnel interact on the street? In Phoenix, the departments get along well, and they have for a long time.

Commander Martin and Chief Moldonado briefed an international group on their collaborative approach two weeks before the summit. They were speaking about the connection between drugs and terrorism when the conversation progressed to the importance of partnerships. An Italian counter-terrorism chief said, “You don’t understand. In Italy there are multiple levels of police, like the United States’ state police, then a county level, and then a local level, and the levels do not communicate.” Communication is influenced by culture as well as language. Phoenix has created, through co-location and dialogue, a culture amenable to communication across departmental lines.

There are currently three people on the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which will grow to eight members, and whose offices are in ACTIC. Chief Maldonado oversees a Haz Mat Intel Officer, who is a bomb squad technician with a degree in construction and a Master’s degree in architecture. Commander Martin oversees an Infrastructure Protection Officer.

The Downtown Phoenix Partnership provides a conduit for communication between emergency services and the private sector, whereby representatives meet to share concerns and listen to each other. This partnership and mutual respect was important when the Diamondbacks won the World Series in 2001, attracting much attention to downtown Phoenix. Phoenix’s downtown operations unit, which only handles downtown operations, was especially useful.
Events like the World Series crowd the downtown area, making it difficult to exit the area. The Homeland Defense Bureau has devised an email alert system to facilitate the departure of people working downtown. Those subscribing to the email alert system will receive an email from the Homeland Defense Bureau informing them of street closures and ideal exit directions. This is an example of a small but helpful way to start working with the private sector. Should a large issue occur, the communications system and atmosphere of mutual trust necessary to handle such a situation will already exist.

In terms of the fire department’s chain of command, Assistant Chief Steve Storeman is in charge of the Homeland Defense Division, and Chief Maldonado, as the Deputy Fire Chief, reports directly to him. Included in the Fire Department chain of command are public health, hospital coordination, and the Baby Shot Program. The Fire Department has become the third largest immunizer for babies in the State of Arizona. Delivering mass immunization, the Fire Department uses every baby shot event as a practice drill for paramedics learning to deliver services in the event of mass post-exposure prophylaxis.

The Command Training Center is a facility where the Lieutenants and Battalion Chiefs work together in Unified Command System practice drills. The Center has a command vehicle, an outfitted Suburban, and command stations arranged inside a building where the command staff runs simulations.

With the leadership of the Haz Mat Technical Rescue team, Phoenix has been developing Rapid Response Teams. Rapid Response Teams will be used to travel statewide in response to incidents of mass destruction. To address incidents involving WMD, Phoenix can utilize the USAR Military Police, the Arizona Task Force One, and the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS). During the Presidential Debate in Tempe, Arizona, the Phoenix Homeland Defense Bureau moved their MMRS truck to Tempe Fire Station 1. In the Valley of the Sun, there are three cities that are MMRS equipped: Mesa, Phoenix and Glendale. In Southern Arizona, Tucson is an MMRS city.

**City Services**

Mike Gretzky, the Director of the City of Phoenix Water Service Division, wanted heightened security for the water supply. As a for-profit enterprise, the City of Phoenix Water Service Division offered to pay for one Commander and one Deputy Chief, but they still needed someone to develop the system. The police and fire departments designed a security system that split security duties between the two departments according to expertise. The Water Commander is from the police department, and the Water Deputy Chief is from the fire department. Fire Chief Phil Yeager, a National Planner for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and a Haz Mat Certified Tech, handles the chemical and planning side of the water supply security system, and Commander Forrest from the police department handles the security elements.
In Phoenix city government, the Police Chief and the Fire Chief each answer to a different Deputy City Manager. In addition to the Deputy City Manager, Chief Maldonado and Commander Martin work closely with the Emergency Manager who physically works out of City Hall where he can field questions from politicians and community members. The Emergency Manager is in charge of all Urban Area Security Initiative Programs. As a city with a nuclear power plant and chemical and fuel tank farms, Phoenix is fortunate to have an Urban Area Security Initiative that emphasizes regionalization.

To originally construct their integrated services model, Phoenix used existing structures: MMRS, and an IMS System that the fire department started in the late 1970s. We are presently engineering instant support teams, capable of addressing major incidents throughout Arizona. The instant support team will participate in and support the Incident Command System and have access to the Rapid Response Teams. There will eventually be three Rapid Response Teams in Phoenix, as Phoenix is in the process of purchasing the Rapid Response Team equipment with Urban Area Security Initiative funds.

In addition to ACTIC, another component of the Homeland Defense Bureau is an Airport Bureau run by a police commander at the airport. The Airport Bureau works in conjunction with Transportation Security Administration (TSA), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and all airport personnel. The fire department also has a station at the airport that works in close concert with the Airport Bureau and airport personnel.

Phoenix is in the process of developing new transportation systems: light rail, expanded bus routes, and freeways. The Homeland Defense Bureau has created a transit commander post. The current transit commander is extremely involved in transportation planning. Having an in-house transit commander gives the Homeland Defense Bureau access to and knowledge of transportation systems and equipment.

This communication between city departments and Homeland Defense is extremely important, especially in the case of the Water Department. The Water Commander and the Haz Mat team understand the process and materials required in the purification of water. They also understand the multiple ramifications if chemicals are stolen. To facilitate the correct response to burglaries, the Water Commander can easily speak with the Police Department to devise a tracking plan.

Phoenix is organizing a Joint Terrorism Task Force for downtown. This will include all downtown and municipal security, public and private. All security personnel understanding and working in the same system will elevate their positions and change their business practices. Everyone in the security field, from Wal-Mart greeters to city police officers, needs to understand terrorist
threats and terrorism measures. They need to understand badge systems and how to handle small events to curtail them before they escalate to larger situations.

Intergovernmental Relations: City, County, State, and Federal

City Government

The Phoenix Police and Fire Departments have great allies in the city government. The Mayor was extremely receptive to Chief Brunicini and Chief Hurt when they formulated the Homeland Defense Bureau and defined its relationship with city government. The Mayor continues to publicly support the police and fire departments’ efforts. He has made several TV appearances to promote the Homeland Defense Bureau. The City Manager’s Office and other city departments have followed suit. An organizational structure that unites the police and fire Departments could have been perceived as threatening to other departments, but there is no animosity. All of the departments proved amenable to the structural changes.

Maricopa County

Phoenix is part of Maricopa County, an area of 10,000 square miles. The City of Phoenix dispatches for 22 different agencies within Maricopa County. As the only fire dispatch centers in the county, the City of Phoenix and the City of Mesa dispatch for the entire area, including over half of Yavapai County which extends 4,000 square miles north into the Bradshaw Mountains.

With the Automatic Aid Consortium, different fire departments respond together to major incidents. Firefighters throughout the Valley of the Sun train together and have the same IMS. In the quarter preceding the summit, 56 Battalion Chiefs from the City of Phoenix and 106 Battalion Chiefs from outlying agencies attended the Command Training Center. To participate in the Automatic Aid Consortium, communities must meet minimum training and staffing standards.

The City of Phoenix uses the Advanced Vehicle Locator (AVL), a computerized system, for dispatching. And because there are no dispatch boundaries within the city limits, it can locate and dispatch the closest unit to the scene. Sharing resources gives communities outside the City of Phoenix access to 70 Phoenix fire trucks, four Haz Mat teams, the TRT Teams, and every other emergency services element that the City of Phoenix offers. Based on this mutual cooperation, Phoenix gains the added security of being able to utilize outside communities’ resources inside the city.

State Involvement

The Governor’s Office of Homeland Security is another critical piece of the overall homeland defense strategy. Commander Martin sits on the State Technical Standards Committee, which regulates the emergency services resources, training, and policies in Arizona’s five regions. This ensures the
compatibility of emergency practices throughout the state. The Technical Standards Committee interviews experts on emergency services and equipment. For example, the Technical Standards Committee listened to an expert's presentation on masks and decided to buy CBRN (Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear) certified masks. 3,100 Phoenix police officers were given personal protective equipment bags with this mask. The fire department used this distribution opportunity to test every officer for tuberculosis and practice a mass another medical drill. Only 1% of people tested positive. Arizona also has a Homeland Security Council that is an umbrella for regional governing councils.

The Governor's Office of Homeland Security, specifically Director Frank Nabaretz and Deputy Director John Phelps, has been extremely helpful in guiding the Phoenix Police and Fire Departments through sometimes rough political waters. They have facilitated federal funding, which trickles from the Governor's Office, through the state and counties, and finally to the City of Phoenix. Commander Martin and Chief Moldonado have made presentations to federal government personnel, including then-Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge. They spoke with him about integrated emergency services, security, and border issues. Despite the detailed discussion of plans and strategies, his question concerned the dynamics between the police and fire departments. Commander Martin and Chief Moldonado were able to respond that the departments support each other and work well together.

FEMA and Federal Marshals
FEMA, along with Arizona Task Force One, is closely tied to the federal government. Arizona Task Force One, accompanied by two bomb squad members from the Phoenix Police Department, was the first task force to respond to the Oklahoma City bombing. The Homeland Defense Bureau has recently made a proposal to add police department personnel to the FEMA Headquarters for security reasons. For example, having bomb squad members available to address secondary devices would be beneficial.

Arizona has a unique relationship with the Federal Marshals. Their program, AS POST, removes jurisdictional restrictions from police officers. Police officers may make arrests, give tickets, and carry out all of their responsibilities throughout the State of Arizona. Seventeen members of the bomb squad are now also Federal Marshals, which adds more power to the FEMA Team. Therefore, if they are deployed, they can carry Federal officers with them.

Unions
Arizona has separate unions for firefighters (the Local 493), police officers, supervisors, and civilian employees. Union representatives were included in the early discussions of the Homeland Defense Bureau, which allowed for easy access to local, county, state and federal level officials. Early inclusion assured mutual trust and cooperation to prevent conflict.
Commander Martin emphasized that the Chiefs and executive staff meet quarterly to discuss their progress, so their documents and policies are living, evolving every day.

**Audience Questions (Modified)**

*Question from Richard Esposito of ABC News:* How do you integrate emergency medical care into your overall model?

**Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:**
- Triage is set up as the extrication sector utilizing the IMS System.
- The patients are then moved to the treatment area and a subsequent transportation sector.
- At the transportation center, they are loaded onto an ambulance and transported to the nearest hospital.
- The Public Health Director is currently devising a plan with area hospitals to compensate for surge.

*Question from Richard Esposito:* Are the days of separate police and fire departments over for mid-size cities?

**Cmdr. T.J Martin:**
- I have learned more about public safety through the police department’s partnerships with the fire department, public health department and the private sector.
- With integration, our physical and intellectual resources have expanded.
- We improve our services every day through partnerships with new people.

*Question from Richard Esposito:* With regards to the private sector and companies like Con Edison, what are your pre-incident plans? How do you develop planning for your assets, and how do you train for those plans? How do you view private sector facilities?

**Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:**
- Todd White, the Police Department’s architecture and bomb specialist, and the Fire Department’s Intelligence Program Manager offer their services doing comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessment with private industry.
- The private sector receives instruction on safety and the protection of architectural design.
- The immunization program is executed in conjunction with the community hospitals and the County Health Departments.
- It also receives private donations.
Cmdr. T.J Martin:
- 85% of our critical sites are privately owned.
- A grant from the Department of Justice Homeland Security Overtime Program provided for officers to contact private sector security officers at businesses.
- They built plans together and shared information.
- The greatest benefit was the chance to develop working relationships with each other.
- Phoenix has a Regional Intelligence Strategy Center located in the communications building that responds to suspicious package calls and threat level orange.
- The Regional Intelligence Strategy Center has a roster of private business and numbers to call.

Question from the Audience: How do you rate the private sector’s response agencies?

Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:
- All of the Haz Mat response teams, public and private, train at the Phoenix Fire Department Operations Center and are certified by the Maricopa County College District.

Question from the Audience: Are there any indicators or performance management systems that you are using jointly under this collaborative model?

Cmdr. T.J Martin:
- We have a Performance Achievement Plan that that guides both departments.
- Though the Fire and Police Departments have different specialties and specific responsibilities, both the Fire Chief and the Police Chief have Homeland Security as one of their top priorities in their Performance Achievement Plans.

Question from Richard Esposito: In regards to city government, is it best for the Police and Fire Departments to report to two different Deputy Mayors, or should it be the same person?

Cmdr. T.J. Martin:
- There should be unity of command at the executive level for the system to function better.
- However, this has not been done because having one person in charge of the two of biggest departments is potentially problematic.

Question from Richard Esposito: The public is rather silent in your model. Do you do tabletop exercises incorporating public liaison officers fully? Is the city government factored in to those same models?
Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:
- Tabletop exercises for our City Management and Mayor's staff are in development. They will be created and implemented through our Special Operations and verified through the police and fire departments.
- We have NIMS training for our Deputy City Managers and other city government staff.
- The City of Phoenix has Citizens Emergency Response Teams (CERT) that utilizes NIMS programming.
- We also have County Medical Response Teams and Volunteer Medical Response Teams that involve all medical professionals in field response efforts.

Cmdr. T.J Martin:
- The volunteer coordinators for the police department and the fire department work side-by-side in the CERT Program.
- They do tabletop exercises with the different citizens groups that already exist.

Question from the Audience: Do you use defense management tools such as Web EOC, Disaster Land, or Bluetooth?

Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:
- We have GIS Programs, CATS, and other programs in our EOC and in both of the dispatch centers.
- We have full-time operators in the dispatch centers that can do plume projections.
- The Phoenix Fire Department has a Tactical Premise Program that gives vital building information and mapping information to units on the scene via Mobile Computer Terminal (MCT) located inside the fire truck.
- We are developing a port so that the Police Department can now have that same type of information and full interoperability with the computers.

Question from the Audience: Can you elaborate on the acquisition of ambulance services?

Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:
- Originally, the Valley of the Sun had five to eight ambulance companies that we would call upon on a rotational basis. If an ambulance was not available within ten minutes of the call, the ambulance company would turn the call to the next company in line.
- The ambulance calls turned more often in the poorer segments of the city.
- Due to inadequate service from the existing ambulance companies, we asked to start an ambulance service in the City of Phoenix. The State Department of Health Services that regulates ambulance services said
that the City of Phoenix did not have the necessary certification to own their own service.

- We utilized the services of Local 493, the firefighters union, to lobby in the state government. By putting firefighters on the trucks themselves, we were allowed to bid on the process.
- Now we can have an ambulance at the scene of an accident within ten minutes of 100% of the calls. Since 1985, we have not missed that objective.
- The entire budget of Emergency Transportation Service five years ago was $7.5 million, and we returned $12.5 million to the general fund of the City of Phoenix through the ambulance service profits.
- We hired 192 new firefighters to staff the ambulances.

Question from Richard Esposito: How do you know what you do not need in the future due to the difficulty in re-certification for certain specialties? In smaller municipalities, specialized units do not maintain their skills. Funding is available, but how do you say no to the money?

Cmdr. T.J Martin:
- Because of the Urban Area Security Initiative’s regional strategy, we built an overnight working group that is in charge of thirteen or fourteen cities on either side of Phoenix.
- The working group determines the capacity of these smaller cities and advises them on strategies for funding desired equipment.
- The funds are available to equip and support the capacity of programs currently in place.

Question from Cliff Karchmer of PERF: How have you or would you handle a mass evacuation in Phoenix?

Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:
- We had to evacuate 25 square miles due to a garden fire in South Phoenix.
- It was a hazardous materials fire with a heavy plume.
- We developed teams and utilized the IMS Sector.
- IMS was separate from command while firefighters were fighting the fire. They told us where and when to start, and we developed a firefighter/police team that canvassed the neighborhood.
- We knocked on doors, made sure that there was a safe area to go to, readied transportation, and coordinated with the transit authority.
- We had eight buses available within 15 minutes – a drill we had practiced.

Cmdr. T.J Martin:
- We have a Community Emergency Notification System, which functions like reverse 9-1-1. It seizes thousands and thousands of phone lines, so you can make a lot of calls at one time.
• We had a chlorine leak that required us to evacuate and transport a lot of people.
• We employed several methods: a helicopter with a loud speaker, officers in patrol cars, and the Community Emergency Notification System.
• We instructed people as to where to go and gave them an idea of how long they would be kept outside of their homes or businesses.
• 400 people were evacuated.

Question from the Audience: How exactly does the Community Emergency Notification System work?

**Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:**
• It functions like reverse 9-1-1.
• We utilize the GIS System to set the parameters of the area to call, and the calls work through Quest.
• The system will call every phone number in the designated parameter and deliver a recorded message with pertinent information.

**Cmdr. T.J. Martin:**
• The Community Emergency Notification System is done through fire dispatch.

**Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:**
• We also have broadcast capabilities with KTR radio channels out of our Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
• We have the radio and reverse Security Information Management System (SIMS).

Question from the Audience: Since you have so little rain, what kind of special operational water usage management plans do you have?

**Deputy Fire Chief John Maldonado:**
• We actually have one of the better water systems in the United States. There is no water shortage in the Valley of the Sun.
• There are severe water problems near the skiing areas surrounding Flagstaff. Due to the deep snow, the water rushes to a series of lakes that support the Valley.
• We also utilize the Central Arizona Project, which transports water to Phoenix from the Colorado River System via canal.
INTEGRATED POLICE AND FIRE SERVICES: THE PUBLIC SAFETY MODEL IN WHITE PLAINS, NEW YORK

Richard L. Lyman
James M. Bradley

Background & Overview

The City of White Plains, New York, is located in the central portion of Westchester County about twenty-two miles north of Grand Central Terminal in New York City. It encompasses an area of approximately ten square miles. The city is situated halfway between the Tappan Zee Bridge, which crosses the Hudson River, and Long Island Sound. The city has major transportation routes (including railways). White Plains' population is currently estimated at 53,078, and the daytime population increases by 177,000 on an average day. This increase requires the department to protect more than three times the resident population on any given day.

White Plains is the seat of Westchester County Government and is the region's judicial center. Federal, state, county and local courthouses are located within the city. It is also the headquarters for major corporations; and functions as a regional retail shopping center for both Westchester and Putnam Counties of New York and Fairfield County of Connecticut. In concert with its diverse economic activity, the city maintains its suburban and residential character.

The White Plains Fire Bureau is the seventh largest career fire department in the State of New York and employs 170 Firefighters. The Bureau has five active fire stations located throughout the city, and operates its own training facilities to simulate and duplicate actual fire situations.

Bureau operations include Suppression, Fire Prevention, Special Operations, Fire Investigations, Training and Administration. In the past 23 years the department has seen more than a 100% increase in the number of alarm responses. There were 1,974 responses in 1981 as opposed to 4,106 responses in 2004.

The Police Bureau is composed of 215 sworn officers and approximately sixty-five civilians. Its operations include Patrol Services, Investigations, Traffic, Motorcycle, Mounted, Community Advocacy, Training, Budget and Administration. The last two years have seen a crime reduction in excess of twenty per cent while service calls arrests and summons issuance have increased dramatically. It is by all quantifiable results a more vibrant and vigorous agency, providing enhanced safety to residents and visitors alike.
More than a timeline of new programs and initiatives, the city’s emergency management plan is a story of organizational change. The City of White Plains Department of Public Safety was established in 1916 and has functioned as a government entity for purposes of budget and administration by a Commissioner since then, but in many ways the concept of a single public safety agency never permeated the organizational structure. The decision-making process was linear and only concentrated at the top of the organization. Both the Police and Fire Bureaus had very separate identities and histories and rarely distinguished mutual success through cooperative ventures. Although both Department Chiefs reported to the same Commissioner of Public Safety and internecine conflicts were rare, neither felt compelled to describe success in terms of the other’s achievements, and new programs were developed and defined singularly.

Although the framework always existed for a vigorous public safety agency, service traditions and history had prevented development. The lessons learned through the catastrophic events of September 11, 2001 served to highlight the hubris of this disengagement. Shortly thereafter, the administration of the Commissioner’s Office changed leadership and the new Commissioner Frank Straub mandated that the Department position itself to function more effectively in the post-9/11 world.

In order to accomplish this goal the Department embarked on the creation of several new protocols and programs and enhanced others already in place:

- COMPSTAT meetings
- Safe Housing Task Force
- Bar/Cabaret enforcement and safety
- Shared Communications
- Emergency Preparedness
- Police ESU and Fire Rescue 88
- Incident Command Protocols
- Funding, Purchasing and Grants
- Building a Public/Private Sector partnerships

**Compstat**

The weekly COMPSTAT meetings have become the backbone of the Department’s organizational change. Chaired by the Commissioner and attended by the senior commanders of both Police and Fire, operational data of both Bureaus is statistically analyzed and presented for review and comment. Questioning is pointed and requires both agencies to seek solutions that are comprehensive, holistic and utilize joint resources. An important concept is that commanders from either Bureau are free to engage in the questioning and recommendations. In this way each officer is not only aware of the other’s problems and challenges but this unique engagement formalizes each other’s stake in the overall success.
Typically, the Police Bureau starts off with a statistical depiction of the crime activity of the past week and months with initial questioning conducted by respective Chiefs and the Commissioner and Deputies. Each respective commander then discusses pertinent factors that have driven either an increase or reduction. At this point everyone in the room can participate and is expected to provide recommendations, especially in their area of expertise. If the issue on the table involves gang members living in a multi-family dwelling, fire personnel will deliver a history of inspections and violations at that location. If the incident in discussion involves multiple fires at a single location the Criminal Investigation Commander must be prepared with a summary of investigation steps to date. Recommendations accepted will be reviewed at the next meeting for efficacy.

Fire Bureau presentations tend to be technical in nature and usually involve both discussions of methods utilized during a fire and the results of critiques of those operations. Observations are turned into recommendations for joint training, especially if a problem is perceived in deployed unified command at a large fire. However, even false alarms are analyzed for the potential information available to the Police Bureau of criminality and for the Fire Bureau of potential Safe Housing investigations. Both agencies discuss budget considerations such as overtime usage and personnel costs, and share management schemes. The emphasis is on the effective coordination of services.

Moving supposedly disparate emergency service agencies into one unified mission involves more than group discussion. In the case of COMPSTAT meetings, the process is as illuminating as the result. The focus of these meetings is collaborative problem solving and quantifiable results. This propels the various senior commanders to develop staff procedures that address these concepts daily. Additionally, commanders of both agencies jointly prepare problem analysis and resolution toward these goals. This forces officers at the level of execution to combine efforts, their shared success reflecting on both agencies and individuals.

Safe Housing Task Force
In 2003, 3,925 civilians died in fires in the United States. Eighty percent or 3,145 of these fire victims died in residential structure fires. Affordable housing and an influx in immigrants into this country has created a situation in some communities where people are living in structures that were not designed to safely house the number of people living there. The Department of Public Safety has created a partnership with other city agencies to address this issue.

In June 2003, Mayor Joseph Delfino introduced the Safe Housing Task Force, whose purpose is to ensure safe housing for all city residents and address quality of life issues through a systematic and sensitive enforcement of White Plains Building and Fire Codes. It is composed of representatives from Fire, Police, Building Department, Law Department, Community Development office, Assessors Office, and Human Rights office. Since its inception, the Fire Bureau
has issued thirty-nine appearance tickets to landlords, comprising more than 350 violations of New York State Fire and Building Codes.

In preparation for implementing the task force, the Fire Bureau put together a program to train police officers and firefighters on indicators of overcrowding to be used as guidelines to determine the possibility of unsafe housing conditions. These conditions include:

- Over-Occupancy - too many people living in one room, hot bedding
- Padlocks on doors
- Hot plates & Refrigerators in bedrooms
- Basement or cellar apartments with inadequate light & ventilation
- Attic apartments - Some older homes do have legal bedrooms on the 3rd floor
- Occupancy of boiler rooms, attic knee walls, closets, porches, kitchens, non-habitable spaces
- Living in a commercial property (people have been found living in basements & storage rooms on commercial properties)
- Multiple mailboxes, cable and telephone lines
- Uncollected accumulation of trash, litter & debris
- Unsafe structures and equipment - substandard or inoperable plumbing, electrical, heating, deteriorated and unsound structures
- Storage of gasoline or other flammable liquids, lawn equipment, hazardous machinery, operating a business inside residence
- Abandoned motor vehicles
- Appliances and furniture in front yard
- Lack of or inadequate heat and hot water
- Excessive storage of combustible materials: occupants accumulate trash, newspaper, mail, books, clothing, etc.

Police and Fire units respond to calls for all types of services that place them in a residential structure (i.e. domestic disputes, noise complaints, fires, hazardous conditions, service calls, etc.) When a police officer witnesses situations of over occupancy and other quality of life issues in the field, the Fire Bureau is notified. A Department Alarm is created when the Fire Bureau responds to an overcrowding or quality of life complaint. A company with an officer responds to investigate. If overcrowding or quality of life violations are observed, a violation ticket is issued and the Building Department is notified to respond. If the owner is present a court appearance ticket may be issued if there are major violations of the building and fire codes.

Unsafe housing conditions are also observed by the Fire Prevention inspectors and fire companies during fire inspection of commercial properties and multiple dwellings. The Assessors Office also observes these conditions during field inspections and passes relevant information on to the Building Department and Fire Bureau for appropriate action.
The Safe Housing Task Force meets on a monthly basis to discuss housing issues and to plan strategies for enforcement and education. Each agency provides information regarding current housing cases and discusses new locations based on complaints and field visits. The collaborative effort of the combined agencies provides mutual benefits to each agency, but its ultimate accomplishment is the provision of safer housing for residents in the community.

Bar/Cabaret Enforcement
Long before the tragedies of Rhode Island and Chicago, the Department of Public Safety established a relationship with bar/cabaret owners based on potential life safety problems observed by both Bureaus. A meeting was held with the bar owner’s association and chaired by the Commissioner in order to emphasize the Department’s commitment and the perceived gravity of the situation. “Cabaret” is a local term to define bars or restaurants that also provide permitted entertainment. White Plains enjoys a very vibrant nightlife and has become an important entertainment area for suburbs surrounding New York City. This results in thousands of patrons per night traveling to the City and attending the various clubs. The point was made at this first meeting that this emerging situation could not be managed in a nonchalant fashion.

Public Safety offered to take a leadership role in collaborative efforts to make the night scene as safe and enjoyable as possible and therefore profitable for the owners as well. Training was provided by police officers and firefighters in areas such as life safety requirements, designer drug use, and underage drinking. This was followed up by multi-agency life safety inspections and underage drinking stings which resulted in a significant increase in compliance. Continuous meetings are conducted with both groups of businesses and individual establishments so that any number of a wide range of issues and incidents can be immediately addressed. In almost all cases, whether it’s a meeting or inspection, Police and Fire are presented to the audience together. This not only cements the public’s view of one agency, but also places rank and file officers together, working on the same project.

The Fire Code of New York State requires that an approved fire safety and evacuation plan be prepared and maintained for Group A (Assembly), having an occupant load of fifty or more persons. Public Assembly Occupancies are given a copy of Section 404--Fire Safety and Evacuation Plans of the Fire Code of New York State--and a generic Fire Safety and Evacuation plan to assist the agencies in developing their own plan.

The generic plan is used as a guideline to develop a plan, including a floor plan, for Public Assembly occupancies. The floor plan identifies the locations of the following: exits, primary and secondary evacuation routes, accessible egress routes, area of refuge, manual fire alarm boxes, portable fire extinguishers, occupant use hose stations, and fire alarm annunciators and controls. The floor plan is laminated and at a minimum posted at the bar, in the kitchen area, and in
the public restrooms. The posted locations indicate on the floor plan “You Are Here”.

There are approximately twenty-five Public Assembly properties that are randomly inspected during hours of operation between ten pm and two am on Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights. These inspections monitor overcrowding and fire safety violations. Inspections are also conducted at the request of Police when overcrowding is suspected. When violations are found, a violation ticket is issued. Establishments with over-occupied Public Assembly Occupancies are immediately given a court appearance ticket and the Building Department is notified.

**Shared Communications**

In 1997, the communications functions of both Departments were combined for a variety of reasons. The Police Bureau was already the primary public safety answering point for both Bureaus. Additionally, since each had their own respective response protocols, incoming alarms were handled as a conference call so both CADS could assign units. Both systems fed a centralized record keeping system. Eliminating this redundancy allowed Fire to assign needed personnel to fire suppression. Presently, the single dispatch center handles Police, Fire and EMS calls for service utilizing police, civilian and, when necessary, fire personnel.

For several years, this arrangement was a bumpy road at best. The expected complaints from rank and file personnel, chagrined to be dispatched by another department, went on for years. The Chiefs had to act as mediators on an almost daily basis to keep the system intact. Although some manpower reallocation goals had been achieved, the system still did not operate flawlessly. However, aspects of a single dispatch center were too important to give up.

One of the most daunting challenges of a joint or unified incident command can be communications and the provision of real time unfiltered information to field commanders. Reliance on telephone connections and the ability of stressed dispatchers to communicate completely and clearly can result in limited success. In this unified system, although multiple dispatchers and call takers are utilized during a significant event, the frequencies are utilized so that a single communications supervisor can oversee the function. Our incident protocols delineate that the senior Fire and Police Commanders will act as incident commanders. In times when the Fire Incident Commander is occupied directing fire operations, administrative and strategic orders can be transmitted by the Police for Fire. Since recall, mutual aid, apparatus response are communicated from the same room, one order can achieve desired results.

More importantly, this single point of contact creates an efficient source point for information dissemination. Even if the Department Emergency Operations Center
is activated, the centralized records system and dispatch allows pertinent decision makers to have the same information simultaneously.

**Emergency Preparedness—Homeland Security Partnerships**
The Terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington demonstrated the need for the development of partnerships with other public and private agencies to coordinate effective planning, response, and recovery in emergencies. The Department of Public Safety, therefore, has formed partnerships with several other agencies.

**Squad 4**
The Westchester County Career Chiefs have created the Westchester Special Operations Task Force to respond to Hazardous Materials, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Haz Mat/WMD) and Technical Rescue emergencies. This partnership has been established between local communities and Westchester County through the Mutual–Aid plan to provide an immediate response with on-duty personnel to large-scale Hazardous Material emergencies or Weapons of Mass Destruction attacks, using common equipment and training.

Currently there are six Squad units located in the Southern part of Westchester County that have been trained and equipped to provide support and decontamination operations during a WMD/Hazmat emergency. The Squads are designed to support the Westchester County and Yonkers Fire Department Hazardous Material Response Teams.

The White Plains Fire Bureau has been designated as Squad 4 and will respond with the Haz Mat/WMD Response Vehicle staffed with five firefighters, and one Lieutenant when requested through Mutual Aid.

The Special Operations Haz Mat/WMD Response Unit (Squad 4) was created by the White Plains Department of Public Works by mounting and refurbishing a pre-owned rescue body on an old fire apparatus chassis. This Unit has a twelve-kilowatt generator with a roof mounted light tower and a cascade system for filling SCBA bottles. The unit will also be available to respond to other emergencies in White Plains and through Mutual Aid to provide emergency lighting, filling SCBA bottles, and rehabilitation of fire fighters.

Respective White Plains Fire Bureau personnel have been trained in the following operations in the event of a Haz Mat/WMD event.
- Hazardous Materials First Responder Operations
- Hazardous Materials Technician
- Emergency Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts
- Emergency Response to Terrorism Technician
- Decontamination
This is a new Homeland Security initiative for the White Plains Fire Bureau. The Bureau is committed to providing this important emergency response service to the local community as well as to surrounding communities.

**Special Operations - Fire Rescue 88 & Police ESU**

The City of White Plains is experiencing a rapid economic and population growth. The safety of our citizens and county residents has become a prominent concern. Based on the City’s growth, the increasing complexity of structures in the City, the ongoing construction activity, the possibility of accidents, the threat of terrorism and need for increased self-sufficiency of the City’s resources the Public Safety Department expanded emergency operations to provide residents and visitors with a higher level of service.

In July of 2003, the Department of Public Safety placed two special operations units into service. The department trained and equipped personnel to staff a Police Emergency Services Unit and a Fire Rescue Unit. The future plan is to house Rescue 88 with Police Emergency Services at a renovated Fire Station. There they will share quarters and will provide an integrated response to emergency situations.

*Fire Rescue 88*

White Plains is a major city and the Fire Bureau had limited capabilities in the areas of collapse rescue, trench rescue, confined space rescue, heavy vehicle extrication (trucks, buses, trains, etc.). The Fire Bureau also had no specialized capability for sustained high-rise firefighting, refilling of breathing apparatus on the scene of emergencies or hazardous materials or chemical or biological agent events. Of primary necessity is the consolidation of specialized equipment on one vehicle so that emergency operations can begin immediately, with no need to wait for equipment to be assembled from different locations in the City.

The Commissioner made it a priority for the 2003-2004 budget year to purchase and equip a Fire Rescue Unit. Bureau personnel formed an apparatus committee that included officers and firefighters who formulated and reviewed specifications for a Fire Rescue. The Common Council approved funding and the committee selected a 2004 Pierce Saber Rescue vehicle that was given the County designation of Rescue 88. Rescue 88 went into service on July 1, 2004.

This is a new initiative for the White Plains Fire Bureau, and requires commitment and teamwork from all personnel to provide this important emergency response service to our community as well as to surrounding communities. Mandatory training includes the following:

- Rescue Technician--Basic
- Accident Vehicle Extrication
- Confined Space Awareness and Rescue
- Trench Collapse Concepts and Operations
- Structural Collapse Concepts and Operations
• Water Rescue
• Rope Rescue
• Firefighter Assisted Search Team (FAST)
• Firefighter Survival
• Weapons of Mass Destruction Monitoring Equipment and Decontamination
• Hazardous Materials Technician
• Specialized Training in Chemical, Biological, Radiological Incidents

**Police ESU**
The primary mission of the White Plains Police Emergency Services Unit is to provide assistance and support to other emergency personnel during incidents that may be beyond the scope of normal police training and capability. These incidents may include but are not limited to: emergency medical needs, hostage incidents, emotionally disturbed persons, barricaded subjects, high-risk warrant service, violent crimes in progress, disasters, and any serious incidents of civil disorder, public demonstrations, and terrorism.

The Unit is staffed by five veteran officers of the Bureau’s Special Response Team and is supervised by an ESU Sergeant. Currently, all unit members are certified E.M.T.’s and one is a certified paramedic. All members had to complete an intense seven-week program where they received training in the following areas:
• Hostage situation,
• Violent crimes in progress
• Barricaded/suicidal persons
• Emotionally disturbed persons
• High and low angle rope rescue
• Water and ice rescue
• Extrication of trapped persons
• High-risk areas searches
• High risk and no-knock warrant service
• Hazardous materials response
• Terrorism Awareness
• CPR and Automated External Defibrillator

The new unit hit the streets in June 2004, operating a specially designed truck that is stocked with advanced tactical equipment, all of which was purchased with asset forfeiture funds from drug cases.

**Joint Training and Planning**
White Plains firefighters and police officers have assisted each other with training in specific subjects during police and fire In-Service Training for years. The training subjects include Fire Bureau Operations, Weapons of Mass Destruction Awareness, CPR, Safe Housing, Transportation of Hazardous Materials, Blood Bourne Pathogens, and EMS First Responder Training. Each Bureau has provided instructors to facilitate this training.
In the past several years, the Commissioner has increased the opportunities for Police and Fire to train and work together. These opportunities include police officers and firefighters training together in the use of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA), basic rope rescue concepts and water rescue (see photo: Wet police officers and firefighters working together). Police and Fire have also trained with a contracted ambulance service that provides Emergency Medical Services for the City of White Plains. The contracted ambulance service (Transcare) is providing instructors for CPR D-fib and Certified First Responders.

Police Officers and firefighters are working and training together to plan and implement multi-agency emergency planning exercises and community events. The Center for Domestic Preparedness' Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) training programs in Anniston Alabama, Responder Operations Radiological /Nuclear, and Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings Awareness Level courses have placed police and fire personnel together to train for a WMD response. These courses are designed for law enforcement officers, firefighters and other emergency personnel who provide the initial response to WMD incidents. The White Plains Department of Public Safety has been training with many other departments/agencies in the surrounding area on a continual basis for these events.

In the spring of 2004, the City of White Plains and the Con Edison Office of Emergency Planning conducted a full-scale hazardous materials exercise. Members of the White Plains Police and Fire Bureaus, Transcare Ambulance Services along with Con Edison’s Biological Response Team participated in this multi-agency exercise. Personnel from Police, Fire, EMS and Con Edison were involved in creating an exercise that would evaluate the participating agencies response to and handling of a hazardous materials incident.

The exercise took place at White Plains Drill School, located on Reservoir Road in the City of White Plains. The scenario goals included a criminal apprehension, rescue of an injured non-ambulatory Con-Edison employee in a hazardous atmosphere, and the isolation of a unit substation using level “A” chemical protective equipment, firefighting and decontamination. Utilizing Incident and Unified Command, the City of White Plains successfully coordinated all responding agencies including the Con Edison HazMat Team to effectively and successfully accomplish all the goals of the drill.

A joint exercise is being planned for the Spring of 2005 that includes multiple agencies from multiple jurisdictions including Fire, Police, EMS and the area hospitals. The goal of this planned exercise is to test the ability of the participating agencies to respond to and coordinate the handling of a tactical situation involving an armed terrorist threat and a simultaneous fire in a school setting.
Operations plans are jointly prepared by Police and Fire for large community events that include parades and Fourth of July and New Year’s celebrations. Recently, a large operations plan was prepared by Public Safety in preparation for the Republican National Convention which took place in New York City. Security issues were addressed with the private sector and operations were planned for a range of contingencies that included consideration of providing decontamination at White Plains Hospital and the Metro North Train Station in the event of a terrorist attack. Local and regional jurisdictions and agencies were contacted and considered during the planning process.

Inter-agency training and planning allows Police, Fire and EMS to work together to build trust and cooperation. Working relationships are established between individuals, teamwork is encouraged; these factors improve both communications and a coordinated response during emergencies. Exchange of information during training and planning lets personnel know what each agency can deliver or assist with during an emergency. Developing these relationships is critical in fostering a collaborative effort, which improves homeland security and emergency response.

Public Safety Incident Command Protocols
The specific protocols appended below were developed by the Commissioner of Public Safety to ensure a cooperative and complimentary response to emergencies. These protocols foster the principle of unified command that integrates police and fire strategy and planning to deliver a coordinated response that protects the public.

Members of the Department of Public Safety must remember that the best response to an emergency is a coordinated and cooperative response. Each Bureau is uniquely equipped and trained. Clear, concise communications from on-scene supervisors are paramount to the effectiveness and proper deployment of personnel and will ensure that all personnel are prepared to safely address any emergency. When the lead agency establishes a command post, a representative of both bureaus will remain at the command post to maintain face-to-face communications.

The following command protocols will be observed when Police and/or Fire Bureau services are required at the scene of an emergency.

Fires: The Fire Bureau will command all fire scenes. The Fire Bureau Incident Commander will direct all fire ground and fire rescue operations. The Police Bureau shall be responsible for scene security, traffic and crowd control. The Police Bureau will assist the Fire Bureau in any non-firefighting operations when requested by the Incident Commander. Emergency Medical Services shall be dispatched and stand by at the scene of any confirmed active fires. All Police Bureau vehicles will be parked in such a manner as not to hamper Fire Bureau operations.
**Crime Scenes:** The Police Bureau shall have command of all crime scenes. The Fire Bureau will be requested to respond at the request of the Incident Commander if services specifically performed by the Fire Bureau are required. Fire Bureau personnel will perform the specific services required with the least amount of intrusion upon the crime scene as necessary and only when requested to do so by the Incident Commander. Only those personnel who are absolutely necessary to perform the required tasks will be allowed to enter the crime scene and they will be entered on the crime scene log. Crime scenes are an integral part of any investigation and prosecution; accordingly, anything observed in a crime scene shall be kept confidential by all personnel and not be discussed or released by any personnel without the authorization of the Commissioner’s office.

**Motor Vehicle Accidents:** The Police Bureau will be responsible for scene safety and investigation of any motor vehicle accidents. The Fire Bureau will be notified and dispatched to any accident scene involving injuries, extrication, hazardous fluid leakage, and/or fire or the threat of fire. The Fire Bureau will be responsible for any extrication, wash down, vehicle stabilization, and/or fire protection. The ranking Emergency Medical services person will be responsible for the coordination of victim treatment and stabilization throughout the operation. All Public Safety personnel will work together to prevent any further injury to the victim, personnel, and the public at large. Human safety will remain paramount at all times. All personnel will also recognize the importance of evidence preservation.

**Bomb Threats/Suspicious Packages (Including White Powder Incidents):** The Police Bureau will have command at the scene of all bomb threats and suspicious packages. The Fire Bureau will be notified and dispatched to such threats as appropriate. The responding Fire Bureau personnel will remain out of the immediate target area unless fire suppression or other fire rescue services are required. In the event of an explosion, the Fire Bureau will then take command of any building collapse, occupant rescue, and fire suppression needed. The Police Bureau will have the responsibility of investigating any crimes involved.

**Structure Collapse:** Both the Police and Fire Bureaus will respond to reports of structural collapses. The Fire Bureau will be in command and be responsible for evaluating the situation, coordinating immediate rescue efforts, and requesting the assistance of other agencies and authorities as required. The Police Bureau will be responsible for traffic, crowd control, and area security. The Police Bureau will also be responsible for identification of victims at the scene, notifications (with the exception of fire personnel), and other administrative and communications functions as necessary.

**Hazardous Materials:** Both the Police and Fire Bureaus will respond to reports of hazardous materials incidents. The Fire Bureau will have command of any hazardous materials incident. Police units will assist as requested by the Fire
Bureau Incident Commander. In responding and/or assisting with an incident involving hazardous materials, all personnel should be cognizant of the potential danger involved and maintain a cautious distance from the suspected materials. After the incident location has been declared safe, the Police Bureau will assist the Fire Bureau in determining if any criminality has occurred and if so, the Police Bureau will be responsible for any criminal investigation.

**Water/Ice Rescues:** Both the Police and Fire Bureaus will respond to any Water/Ice rescue incidents. The Fire Bureau will be in command of any rescue efforts. Each Bureau will cooperate and assist the other as requested and appropriate. The Fire Bureau Incident Commander will determine if it becomes necessary to request the assistance of a dive team or other outside agency assistance.

**Fire Investigations:** If the Fire Bureau Incident Commander determines a fire to be suspicious, he will order a Fire Bureau Cause and Origin Investigator to the scene to investigate. If the Fire Bureau Investigator determines the fire to be suspicious, he/she will notify the Tour Commander who will notify the Police Bureau’s Criminal Investigations Division. The Criminal Investigations Detective and Fire Bureau Investigator will work jointly to preserve evidence for a Police Criminal Investigation. All information and the appropriate release thereof will be managed by the Police Bureau.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction:** Both the Police and Fire Bureaus will respond to any incident involving weapons of mass destruction. The Fire Bureau will be in charge of assessing the immediate threat and hazard. The Police Bureau will be responsible for traffic control, crowd control, and area security. The highest-ranking members from both bureaus will confer regarding evacuation, notifications, and requests for outside assistance. The Fire Bureau will remain cognizant that the scene is also an active crime scene and that once the threat has been stabilized, they will relinquish command to the Police Bureau for criminal investigation.

**Helicopter Landings:** The Fire Bureau will command all landing zones. The Fire Bureau Incident Commander will direct all helicopter operations. The Police Bureau personnel at the scene will be responsible for traffic and crowd control, and will assist with other operations only at the request of the Fire Bureau. All Police Bureau vehicles will be located in such a manner as to not hinder Fire Bureau operations.

**Special Transportation Accidents (aircraft, busses, trains, and trucks):** Both the Police and Fire Bureaus will respond to reports of special transportation accidents. If the potential for hazardous materials and/or a high number of casualties exists, the Fire Bureau will be in control. The Police Bureau will be responsible in routine incidents. The Police Bureau will be responsible for traffic control, crowd control, area security, and assisting the Fire Bureau in initial aid
and recovery of victims. Any extended need for extrication and recovery of victims will be performed by the Fire Bureau with Police Bureau oversight on investigation and crime scene. The Police Bureau will be responsible for the identification of victims, notifications, and other administrative and communications functions as necessary.

**Elevator Incidents:** Both the Police and Fire Bureaus will respond to any elevator incidents involving persons injured or trapped. The Fire Bureau will have command of the scene and will be responsible for any rescue of trapped or injured persons, as well as the shutdown of any malfunctioning elevators. The Police bureau will be responsible for area security, identification of victims at the scene, notifications, and other administrative and communications functions as necessary.

**Budget, Purchasing and Grants**
The Department of Public Safety’s objectives are to preserve the rights of citizens and reduce fear in the City through the prevention of crime, prevention and suppression of fire, and the anticipation of and response to events that threaten public order. Public Safety’s mission also requires that the Department deal with a wide range of behavioral and social problems that arise in the city.

The City of White Plains is a well managed and financially sound city which provides services to the community for the protection of persons and property. The Department of Public Safety budget for the Fiscal Year 2004-2005 exceeds 47 million dollars. Police and Fire share this common budget without duplicating services, which are designed to be complementary and not competitive. The Commissioner of Public Safety is responsible for the efficient management of these funds for both Police and Fire.

Police and Fire utilize Homeland Security grant funds to purchase complementary equipment, develop specialized units, and provide training to personnel. Through Emergency Planning the use of these funds is coordinated jointly for the benefit of the city and surrounding communities, avoiding both duplication of services and equipment and unnecessary redundancy.

**Building a Community with the Public/Private Sector**
Over the past two years one of the Department’s goals has been to become not only a greater part of the community but to have the community become a greater part of the Department. In furtherance of that goal, four distinct programs were developed.

*Citizen Emergency Response Training*
The goal of the CERT program is to provide volunteers with basic skills needed to respond to the community’s immediate needs in the aftermath of a natural or man-made disaster. The twenty four-hour CERT course was provided to
volunteer firefighters and auxiliary police officers and encompassed nine training units: Emergency Preparedness, Fire Safety, Emergency Medical Operations I, Emergency Medical Operations II, Light Search and Rescue Operations, CERT Organization, Disaster Psychology, Terrorism and Disaster Simulation. All of these topics were taught by a team of police officers and firefighters to a common audience.

**Counter Terrorism for Businesses**
It became clear that many of the local businesses and institutions were confused about their place in the war against terrorism. They were not only unaware of potential local dangers, but the national and regional strategies and what part they could play. A seminar was developed by the Department and the Office of the District Attorney that brought in counter terrorism experts that provided pragmatic information to senior executives and began a partnership between law enforcement and the business community.

**Security Director’s Council**
White Plains is a major shopping hub in suburban Westchester County. It is home to three major malls and most of the national and upscale department stores. Contact with security directors was frequent, but individual and de facto and did not represent an organized attempt to share information between the Department and retail as a distinct group. This group was created in order to meet regularly to share information that is local (“Where are the bad guys?”), regional, such as the impact of the Republican National Convention, and national (“What does an elevated alert mean to shoppers?”). Practical discussion of life safety plans and fire issues are part of the agendas.

**Joint Inspections of Houses of Worship**
One of the recent elevated terror alerts was specific to threats against houses of worship, specifically synagogues and temples. Our response was to meet with all of the rabbis in the City to hear the concerns of their congregations and to provide tangible assurances of the precautions planned by the Department. Joint, frequent inspections by police officers and firefighters immediately began, as an important religious season was imminent and we felt very strongly that people must feel comfortable and safe expressing their individual religious beliefs. A pleasant side result of this endeavor was a much stronger relationship with all houses of worship within the City.

**Summary / Conclusion**
Historically, police and fire departments have operated independently of each other having separate budgets, communication systems and separate administrative and command structures. Police and fire inter-organizational relations are based on a culture that has been created during the last one hundred years or more. Culture in the public safety arena can be defined as “the predominating attitudes and behavior that characterize the functioning of a group
or organization.” Public Safety organizations that are competitive and operate independently during an emergency without organized command and control procedures with specific protocols will most likely have a less than satisfactory conclusion.

The White Plains Public Safety Model offers a command and administrative structure that provides a coordinated emergency response. This model also stresses a collaborative effort with other agencies and the private sector regarding mutual public safety concerns and the creation of partnerships in safe housing, crime and fire prevention, education and emergency planning and response.

**Audience Questions (Modified)**

*Question from Richard Esposito, ABC News:* There is a dam on the outskirts of White Plains that could break and force a 100,000-person evacuation. How does the White Plains model work in relation to the Westchester County Police and the New York City authorities?

**Chief Richard Lyman:**
- Commissioner Sutton oversees the emergency services in the county. We talk frequently.
- Our training academy and police academy are co-located, but there is a fence dividing the academies.
- More interaction between the new firefighters and police officers would be positive.
- We have emergency response plans, do tabletops, and discuss issues such as the dam.
- There is a citywide Emergency Response Plan that concerns the dam, but we should do more county-wide work.

*Question from Audience:* Do you have a common radio channel or frequency, or do you use separate systems?

**Chief Jim Bradley:**
- We are on the same system.
- It is a ten-channel system that is divided between police and fire.
- All of the radios scan so that everyone can hear calls for the fire department or the police department.
- The key is that the call can reach common call takers and go to common dispatchers. Thus, one could dispatch a police call and immediately dispatch a fire call.
- We have a combined Computer Aided Dispatch system (CAD).

*Question from Audience:* Have you taken that outside of White Plains or Westchester County?
Chief Jim Bradley:
- Westchester has forty-three different police departments and fifty-eight different fire departments.
- A countywide interoperable radio mutual system is in development.
- We have mutual aid systems for our Special Response Teams (SRT).
- Very few local SRT Teams were prepared to perform catastrophic relief tasks, so we partnered with the SWAT and SRT teams from the cities.
- They taught the local SRT Teams how to handle plane hits, train hits, etc.

Chief Richard Lyman:
- The county is interested in spending Homeland Security money on radio systems that allow users to patch multiple systems together.
- It may not be the best solution, but we need a radio system with interoperability.

Question from Richard Esposito: What is the value of your model for the State of New York? What is the State Police’s role in these new models?

Chief Jim Bradley:
- The State Police is very much involved in the model.
- They are part of the local mutual aid plan and the local communication plans.
- White Plains works on its own radio frequency.
- Much of the funding for county emergency management comes from the State Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP).

Question from Richard Esposito, directed to the Phoenix and Charlotte officers: What is the intelligence component of your model? How does it connect to your preparedness information?

Chief Jeffrey Dulin:
- We have a detective in the FBI office because he has top-secret clearance.
- We receive intelligence information directly from the FBI through this detective.
- Any information that is critical for intelligence comes through the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department’s command staff to the Homeland Security Director.
- This information is shared at Joint Terrorism Task Force meetings.

Chief Jim Bradley:
- The procedure is similar in White Plains.
- There is a city representative on the local JTTF who can relay intelligence.
• The State Police structure regional meetings for our intelligence officers. The State Police intelligence division then passes on the information from the ODP.
• When we were planning for the RNC Convention, we coordinated with our intelligence counsel through the State Police.

Cmdr. T.J. Martin:
• We get intelligence from both DHS and JRRF.
• They say the same things though in a slightly different language.

Chief Jeffrey Dulin:
• We get the best information from our local FBI agent.
• The information comes more quickly than through DHS or the State.
• This partnership with the FBI agent produces a positive relationship with the federal government.

Deputy Chief John Maldonado:
• We prefer local representatives to larger entities.
• We have a Safe Streets Task Force that we use for violent crimes and general street safety.
• Safe Streets Task Force members will be connected to DNS and DHS if the budget can accommodate the change.
AUTHORS'/PRESENTERS INFORMATION

Jeffrey Dulin has been in the fire service for twenty-seven years including twenty-five years as a volunteer firefighter in Mecklenburg County. In December 2002, Jeff was promoted to the rank of Deputy Chief. He currently oversees B-Shift of the Operations Division, EMS Liaison, the department’s Special Operations and the Training Division. In addition, Jeff oversees the N.C. Regional USAR-3 Team and the N.C. 7th Regional Haz-Mat Team, both housed in the Charlotte Fire Department.

Jerry Sennett was promoted to his current rank in January 2004, becoming the Deputy Chief for the Support Services Group. During his career with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Chief Sennett has worked as an officer in patrol and vice and narcotics, and as the Recruit Training Commandant Sergeant at the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Training Academy. Chief Sennett also served as the Central Service Area Patrol Captain and Major prior to his promotion to Deputy Chief.

Arnold M. Howitt, Ph.D., is Executive Director of the Kennedy School’s Taubman Center for State and Local Government and Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy. He serves as faculty co-chair of the executive program on Crisis Management and of the program for Beijing senior officials and teaches in several other KSG executive programs. His research focuses in part on emergency preparedness and crisis management. For four years he directed KSG’s research program on domestic preparedness for terrorism. Howitt served on an Institute of Medicine panel that authored Preparing for Terrorism (2002), and is coauthor and coeditor of Countering Terrorism: Dimensions of Preparedness (2003).

John Maldonado has been a member of the City of Phoenix Fire Department for over twenty-six years. Chief Maldonado attended Arizona State University’s Fire Executive Program. He was also a faculty member of the Maricopa County Community College system in which he taught Firefighter Safety and Building Collapse at Phoenix College. He is also a Phi Theta Kappa Certified Leadership Development Instructor. Chief Maldonado is currently a co-director of the City of Phoenix Homeland Defense Bureau. He also serves as the chair of the Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee.
T.J. Martin is a Commander with the Phoenix Police Department where he has served for twenty-one years. He has worked as a Field Training Sergeant, in Gang Enforcement, Operation Weed & Seed, and Operation Safe Streets. As a Lieutenant he worked in Inspections, as an Administrative Lieutenant for the Patrol Division, and in the Strategic Management Team. He currently serves as Commander for the Homeland Defense Bureau and was instrumental in its creation and development. He has been commended for teaching in the areas of Cultural Communications, Homeland Security and Enlightened Leadership, as well as his involvement in the passage of the Anti-Slumlord Bill. Commander Martin continues to be active in the community through the Central Arizona Shelter Services Strategic Planning Committee and the Neighborhood Planning Committee.

Richard L. Lyman is a twenty-eight year veteran of the 170-member White Plains Fire Bureau. He worked his way through the ranks to become Chief on June 9, 2004. Chief Lyman is the 8th career chief in the history of the city of White Plains Department of Public Safety and oversees the Fire Bureau's operations under the direction and control of the Commissioner of Public Safety.

James M. Bradley is a thirty-year veteran of the City of White Plains Department of Public Safety and is in his fourteenth year as the Chief of Police. As the Chief Executive Officer of the seventh largest municipal Department in New York State, he oversees the management of uniformed services, all investigative units, personnel and information systems.

Frank G. Straub, Ph.D., serves as the Commissioner of Public Safety for the City of White Plains, New York. Prior to his current position, he served as the New York City Police Department's Deputy Commissioner of Training and as an Assistant Commissioner in the Counterterrorism Bureau. He has been since 1995 an adjunct professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Department of Public Management.

Brian J. Nickerson, Ph.D., JD, is Chair and Associate Professor in the Department of Public Administration at Pace University. He also directs the University’s Edwin G. Michaelian Institute for Public Policy & Management within the Dyson College of Arts & Sciences. Since 1993, Professor Nickerson has been teaching an array of graduate-level courses in public policy, law, and organizational management. His work has been published in numerous international and national professional and academic journals.